GORDON_FINAL (ARTICLE 1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

8/28/2014 2:24 PM

OF GANGS AND GAGGLES: CAN A CORPORATION
BE PART OF AN ASSOCIATION-IN-FACT RICO
ENTERPRISE? LINGUISTIC, HISTORICAL, AND
RHETORICAL PERSPECTIVES
Randy D. Gordon∗
ABSTRACT
Over 30 years ago, courts of appeals began to hold that the RICO
statute’s definition of “association-in-fact enterprise” is broad enough to
include corporations as constituent members, even though the definition
states that such an association is limited to a “group of individuals.” 1 This
article demonstrates why these cases were wrongly decided from a variety
of perspectives: linguistic, systemic, and consequentialist. It also suggests
a strategy for correcting this widespread interpretive error and provides
evidence that the Supreme Court may be disposed to agree that the lower
courts have uniformly erred.
ABSTRACT.................................................................................................. 973
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 974
I.A RANDOM WALK THROUGH GANGLAND .............................................. 975
A. RICO and Its Aims .................................................................. 975
B. A Brief History of Organized Crime Legislation .................... 977
C. The Structure of RICO and the Importance of “Enterprise” ...979
II.TURKETTE, BOYLE, AND THE PROBLEM OF ASSOCIATION-IN-FACT
ENTERPRISES................................................................................... 982
A. Foundational Principles: Turkette ........................................... 982
B. The Latest Word: Boyle .......................................................... 983

∗ Ph.D., Edinburgh; LL.M., Columbia; J.D., Washburn; Ph.D., M.A., B.A., Kansas. Partner
with the firm of Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP, adjunct faculty member in law and English at
Southern Methodist University. The author wishes to thank Cole Davis, his research
assistant and a student at the Dedman School of Law at SMU, for his considerable
contribution to the authorities cited below. The views expressed in this article are the
author’s alone and do not necessarily represent those of the firm or its clients.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006).

973

GORDON_FINAL (ARTICLE 1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

974

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

8/28/2014 2:24 PM

[Vol. 16.4

III.POST-BOYLE DECISIONS ........................................................................ 987
A. The “Contingent Commission” Cases ..................................... 987
1. The Alleged Enterprises..................................................... 988
i. Associations in Fact—The broker-centered
enterprises ................................................................... 990
ii. Legal entity—The CIAB Enterprise ............................ 991
iii. The Marsh-centered enterprise..................................... 991
B. Gonzalez v. Bank of America Insurance Services................... 992
C. Special Problems under § 1962(c) in the Civil Context .......... 996
IV.INTERPRETING § 1961(4) ...................................................................... 997
A. Linguistic Arguments .............................................................. 998
1. Turkette and its interpretation of “enterprise” ................... 998
2. The Pro and Con of Plain Meaning Arguments ............... 1001
i. Grammar and Syntax ................................................. 1001
ii. Illustrative or Exhaustive ........................................... 1006
iii. Structural Issues ......................................................... 1008
iv. A Dash of History ...................................................... 1010
B. Systemic Arguments .............................................................. 1011
1. Contextual Harmonization ............................................... 1011
2. Precedential Argument .................................................... 1012
3. Analogical Argument....................................................... 1013
4. Conceptual Argument ...................................................... 1014
5. General Principles Argument........................................... 1016
6. Historical Argument ........................................................ 1017
C. Teleological-Evaluative Arguments: Consequentialism by
Another Name ....................................................................... 1018
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................... 1028

INTRODUCTION
Americans find gangsters at once fascinating and frightening. One
can confirm the former with reference to the billions of dollars patrons
have spent on Mafia-inspired movies like the Godfather series, Wiseguys,
and Goodfellas, and the latter with reference to the myriad statutes that
Congress and many state legislatures have passed aimed at eradicating
“organized” crime. This article examines one aspect of a key pillar in this
effort to destroy organized crime—namely, the “enterprise” element of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 2

2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006) (“‘[E]nterprise’ includes any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
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Part I generally introduces the history of organized crime legislation in
the United States, explains how RICO relates to, and grows out of, that
history, and demonstrates how the concept of “enterprise” is central to
RICO jurisprudence. Part II picks up with one aspect of the statutory
definition of enterprise—the association-in-fact enterprise (also referred to
as the “association in fact” enterprise)—and looks back at the history of
that provision’s interpretation in the United States Supreme Court. Part III
considers very recent interpretations of “association in fact” in the circuit
courts and suggests how those interpretations create special problems in the
type of RICO case most commonly seen in civil litigation. Part IV
examines the association-in-fact definition from a variety of linguistic,
systemic, and teleological-evaluative vantage points to determine whether a
corporation can be part of an association in fact. I conclude that it cannot,
and the circuit courts that have held otherwise are wrong. Part V concludes
by recommending a course of action that will bring the question of whether
a corporation can be part of an association in fact to the attention of the
Supreme Court.
I.

A RANDOM WALK THROUGH GANGLAND

A. RICO and Its Aims
If one were charged with drafting legislation designed to root out
organized crime, the first step would be to consider what makes
“organized” crime organized and what types of things organized criminals
do. One way to conceptualize the issue would be to plot the degree of
organization along one axis and the types of criminal activity along
another. For example, two individuals could come together two or three
times to rob a bank, or occasionally to purchase a large quantity of drugs at
wholesale value for resale to each individual’s own set of customers. Is
this crime “organized?” It is hard to say. Alternatively, compare those two
individuals to the Mafia, which has hundreds of members, strict
membership criteria, a long history, is highly organized along the lines of a
Roman Legion, and (sometimes) has well defined areas of criminal
expertise. Is this crime “organized?” Almost everyone would agree that
this is the paradigmatic case, although—as we will now see—the array of
criminal acts undertaken by even a highly structured organization like the
Mafia presents difficulties for our hypothetical draftsman. 3

individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity[.]” § 1961(4)).
3. For an overview of what organized criminals do, see Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The
Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 669–70 (1987).
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With respect to what organized criminals do, first is the illicit
commercial angle. Organized criminals make goods and services available
that would otherwise be unavailable because they are illegal, like narcotics,
gambling, and prostitution. 4 Second, they police their markets and rid them
of rivals through murder and other violent acts. 5 Third, they corrupt law
enforcement and other public officials through bribery and intimidation. 6
Fourth, they invest the proceeds of illegal activities in legitimate
businesses, through which they may commit further illegal acts like money
laundering and tax evasion by skimming profits. 7 Fifth, they muscle in on
legitimate organizations like unions to gain access to pension funds and to
take over lucrative lines of business like longshoring or trucking. 8 Sixth,
they extract money from legitimate business through protection rackets or
loansharking. 9 Seventh, they commit crimes like bank robberies and
hijacking. 10
To state these ranges of form and activity is to describe a difficult
exercise in classification. Specifically, it is hard to design a statutory
scheme that is broad enough to cover the target group without being so
vague as to risk unconstitutionality. Some have argued that the latter is
indeed the case with RICO. 11 But others have made a persuasive case that
the statute, when drafted, was reasonably narrow and that any (or at least
most) vagueness now inherent in it is a result of poor statutory construction
in the courts. 12 It is thus worthwhile to consider the context in which RICO

4. Id.
5. Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalization of Crime, 22 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 213, 254 (1984).
6. Lynch, supra note 3, at 734–36.
7. Id. at 669–70.
8. G. Robert Blakey & Ronald Goldstock, “On the Waterfront”: RICO and Labor
Racketeering, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341, 343–46 (1980).
9. Leslie G. Kanter, RICO’s Unlawful Debt Collection Provision, 52 BROOK. L. REV.
957, 968–69 (1987).
10. See generally JAY S. ALBANESE, ORGANIZED CRIME IN OUR TIMES (Janice Eccleston
ed., 5th ed. 2007).
11. For a discussion on the potential constitutional weaknesses and vagueness of
RICO’s definition and application, see George C. Freeman, Jr. & Kyle E. McSlarrow, RICO
and the Due Process “Void for Vagueness” Test, 45 BUS. LAW. 1003, 1008–10 (1990);
Michael S. Kelley, “Something Beyond”: The Unconstitutional Vagueness of RICO’s
Pattern Requirement, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 331, 380–94 (1991); Jed S. Rakoff, The
Unconstitutionality of RICO, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 11, 1990, at 3; Terrance G. Reed, The Defense
Case for RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691, 721–27 (1990).
12. See Antonio J. Califa, RICO Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAND. L. REV. 805, 815–
17 (1990) [hereinafter Califa] (noting that legislative history reflects congressional intent to
limit RICO’s application, but these limits have been minimized through expansive judicial
interpretation); Barry Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291, 294 (1983) (observing
that “some judges . . . have strained to adopt broad constructions of RICO” with the result
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was adopted, as well as fledgling judicial efforts to apply it. Against this
backdrop, we will see that the United States Supreme Court’s most recent
interpretation of RICO’s “enterprise” element was in some sense
misguided, yet further unwarranted expansion is easily and mostly
correctible by the very same “plain meaning” logic that led to error in the
first place.
B. A Brief History of Organized Crime Legislation
In late 1949, a series of newspaper and magazine articles warned that
a national crime syndicate was seizing control of America’s major cities;
these reports squared with the findings of local crime commissions in
Chicago and California, which also found official corruption under the
influence of syndicated crime. 13 At the time, there were few weapons in
the federal arsenal to deploy against organized crime, and cries for federal
assistance came from many quarters, including the mayors of Los Angeles,
New Orleans, Portland, and other cities. 14 In response, on January 5, 1950,
Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee introduced a resolution authorizing
the Committee on the Judiciary to investigate interstate racketeering
activities and the use of the facilities of interstate commerce for purposes of
organized crime. 15 After much procedural and jurisdictional wrangling
between Senate committees, the Special Committee to Investigate
Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce was directed to study and
investigate
whether organized crime utilizes the facilities of interstate
commerce or otherwise operates in interstate commerce in
furtherance of any transactions which are in violation of the
law . . . and, if so, the manner and extent to which, and the
identity of the persons, firms, or corporations by which such
utilization is being made . . . . 16
The resolution specifically prohibited the committee from interfering
in any way with the rights of the States to regulate gambling within their
borders. 17
that “the scope of the RICO statute has been expanded far beyond what was intended by
Congress.”).
13. Guide to the Records of the U.S. Senate at the National Archives: Chapter 18.
Records of Select Committees, 1946–68, THE CENTER FOR LEGISLATIVE ARCHIVES,
http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-18-1946-1968.html (last visited
June 26, 2013).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. S. Res. 202, 81st Cong. (1950).
17. Guide to the Records of the U.S. Senate at the National Archives, supra note 13.
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For at least three (somewhat overlapping) reasons, the committee’s
work attracted considerable public interest. First, the subject matter was
already high in the public’s conscience; second, the committee held
hearings throughout the country and summoned a number of high-profile
political and underworld figures to testify; and third, the committee was the
first to hold televised hearings. 18 Ultimately, the committee’s work led to
citations for contempt of the Senate against, among many others, the
famous mobster Frank Costello and a host of local indictments against
criminals and corrupt officials. 19 Along the way, the committee issued four
reports, which in sum concluded nationwide organized crime syndicates
did exist and that they had a corrupting influence on state and local
government. 20 The committee also posited a number of possible legislative
solutions, only one of which passed the Senate. 21
Against this deep background, the direct legislative history of RICO
begins in 1967 with the report of the President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice (popularly known as the
Katzenbach Commission). 22 Analyses of the Commission’s report are
readily available elsewhere, so a short summary will do for our purposes.
According to Judge Lynch,
the report of the Katzenbach Commission is significant in the
legislative history of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
because so many of the provisions of the act find their origins in
recommendations of that body and, in particular, in the analysis
performed by its task force on organized crime. Three aspects of
the Commission’s response to organized crime are particularly
notable. First, despite occasional recognition of the diffuse
nature of “organized criminal groups,” the Commission clearly
conceived of organized crime as a single entity and directed its
primary attention toward a single target: the Italian syndicate it
believed controlled organized crime throughout the United States.
Second, the Commission saw as a prime aspect of the threat
posed by this syndicate its increasing tendency to involve itself in
legitimate business and union activities. Finally, while the
Commission’s conception of the menace of organized crime is

18. Id.
19. Special Committee on Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce (The Kefauver
SENATE
HISTORICAL
OFFICE,
Committee),
U.S.
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/Kefauver.htm
(last
visited June 26, 2013).
20. Guide to the Records of the U.S. Senate at the National Archives, supra note 13.
21. Id.
22. Lynch, supra note 3, at 666.
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significant in understanding the thinking of those who drafted the
RICO statute, the Commission itself did not recommend
enactment of anything resembling RICO. 23
Despite the immediate introduction of a flurry of anti-crime legislation
in the wake of the Commission report, Congress took no action on the two
bills generally acknowledged as RICO precursors, S. 2048 (preventing
investment of unreported income in another business) and S. 2049
(preventing investment of income derived from specified crimes in a
business). 24 The bills’ sponsor, Senator Roman Hruska, emphasized the
proposed legislation’s usefulness in blocking the criminal penetration of
legitimate business rather than the primary criminal acts associated with
organized crime. 25 Indeed, as Lynch points out, the language chosen was
broad enough to snare anyone investing ill-gotten proceeds in a business,
not just Mafiosi. 26 But the legislation went nowhere, and it was left to the
next Congress to take decisive action.
C. The Structure of RICO and the Importance of “Enterprise”
As I have argued elsewhere and will not belabor here, the structural
complexity and expansive language of the RICO statute, when coupled
with the different (and often competing) policy aims behind criminal law
enforcement and civil litigation, have forced courts to interpret the statute
in ways that would make it effective, yet bounded. 27 RICO thus presents
two very different faces. Government prosecutions, on the one hand, look
very much like what one would expect from an anti-racketeering, antiMafia statute: typical indictments target drug distribution rings, interstate
bank-robbery gangs, or the organized infiltration of a union or pension
fund. 28 Private RICO litigation, on the other hand, rarely turns on
23. Id. at 672–73.
24. Id. at 673.
25. Id. at 674.
26. Id.
27. Randy D. Gordon, Clarity and Confusion: RICO’s Recent Trips to the United
States Supreme Court, 85 TUL. L. REV. 677 (2011) [hereinafter Gordon, Clarity and
Confusion]; Randy D. Gordon, Crimes That Count Twice: A Reexamination of RICO’s
Nexus Requirements Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1964(c), 32 VT. L. REV. 171 (2007)
[hereinafter Gordon, Crimes That Count Twice]; Randy D. Gordon, Rethinking Civil RICO:
The Vexing Problem of Causation Under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 319 (2005)
[hereinafter Gordon, Rethinking Civil RICO].
28. E.g., Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 941–42 (2009) (exhibiting the
prosecution of a bank robbery gang); United States v. Daidone, 471 F.3d 371, 373 (2d Cir.
2006) (depicting a loansharking, extortion, witness tampering, and murder prosecution);
United States v. Polanco, 145 F.3d 536, 538–39 (2d Cir. 1998) (providing an example of a
gun and drug distribution, murder prosecution).
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Hollywood-style mobster activity: typical complaints turn on allegations of
fraud in insurance, franchise, or other commercial transactions. 29 But there
is at least one thing that courts, commentators, and RICO practitioners
(both civil and criminal) can agree on: the concept of “enterprise” is the
sine qua non of any RICO claim and the characteristic that distinguishes a
RICO claim from an ordinary tort or criminal claim. 30 Consequently, a
failure sufficiently to allege an enterprise disables a claim under any
substantive RICO theory. 31
29. E.g., Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2010) (showing
fraud in connection with collection of sales taxes); Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co.,
553 U.S. 639, 643–45 (2008) (exhibiting fraud and bid rigging); Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply
Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 454–55 (2006) (depicting fraud in connection with collection of sales
taxes); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Watson, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1031 (W.D. Ark.
2000) (“‘[A] high percentage of civil RICO cases, unlike typical antitrust cases, involve
fraud claims.’” (quoting Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 191 (1997))). As of
1985, “of the 270 known civil RICO cases at the trial court level, 40% involved securities
fraud, 37% common-law fraud in a commercial or business setting, and only 9%
‘allegations of criminal activity of a type generally associated with professional criminals.’”
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 n.16 (quoting Arthur F. Mathews et al,
Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force, ABA SECTION OF CORP., BANKING, & BUS.
LAW 55–56 (1985)). Additionally, “[r]oughly two fifths of all civil actions under RICO are
based on charges that the defendant committed mail or wire fraud.” Horace D. Nalle, Jr.,
Civil RICO Claims Predicated on Mail or Wire Fraud: The Indispensability of Reliance,
109 BANKING L.J. 272, 272 (1992) (footnote omitted). However, in 2011 the Second Circuit
held on a matter of first impression that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s RICO
amendment bars a plaintiff from asserting a civil RICO claim based on predicate acts of
securities fraud, including mail or wire fraud. See MLSMK Inv. Co. v. JP Morgan Chase &
Co., 651 F.3d 268, 277 (2d Cir. 2011). This is true even if the plaintiff cannot pursue a
separate, freestanding securities fraud claim against the defendant. Id.
30. See Ouwinga v. Benistar 419 Plan Servs., Inc., 694 F.3d 783, 794 (6th Cir. 2012)
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2735 (May 28, 2013) (“An association-in-fact enterprise ‘require[s]
a certain amount of organizational structure which eliminates simple conspiracies from the
Act’s reach.’”); Bonner v. Henderson, 147 F.3d 457, 459 (5th Cir. 1998) (“By the very
language of the statute, the existence of an enterprise is an essential element of a RICO
claim.”); United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same); Chang v
Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1298–99 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled by Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486
F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that because the focus of RICO is on “organized” crime, an
“organizational nexus” must be found at the heart of a scheme actionable under RICO); see
also Gordon, Crimes That Count Twice, supra note 27, at 171–72; discussion supra Part
IV.A. Whether an enterprise is required for liability under the conspiracy prong of
§ 1962(d) is not as certain. See United States v. Harris, 695 F.3d 1125, 1131 (10th Cir.
2012) (holding that on issue of first impression, “the existence of an enterprise is not an
element of § 1962(d) conspiracy to commit a substantive RICO violation”); United States v.
Applins, 637 F.3d 59, 75 (2d Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 813 (2011).
31. E.g., Cruz v. FXDirectDealer, LLC, 720 F.3d 115, 120 (2d Cir. June 19, 2013)
(dismissing § 1962(c) claim for failure to allege an “enterprise” separate from the RICO
“person”); ISystems v. Spark Networks, Ltd., 10-10905, 2012 WL 3101672, at *5 (5th Cir.
Mar. 21, 2012) (failure to plead functional separation between two entities is a “fail[ure] to
allege a sufficiently distinct RICO ‘enterprise’ and therefore an actionable RICO claim”);
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But not only is the “enterprise” concept important to RICO
jurisprudence, it has become paramount as other theories about RICO’s
interpretation and application have advanced and then fallen away. For
example, early on, courts placed a gloss on RICO § 1964(c) that demanded
pleading and proof of “racketeering injury.” 32 But the Supreme Court, in
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., soon removed this and similar collars that
the lower courts had placed on civil RICO. 33 Thereafter, the path was clear
for plaintiffs to bring civil claims that had nothing to do with the
prototypical crimes of gangsters (murder, arson, extortion, etc.); allegations
of fraud facilitated by two uses of the mail or wires would be enough to get
a party started. 34 With the dampers on RICO’s civil scope removed, lower
courts attempted to stanch the litigation flow in two ways. First, they
began to give new bite to the civil-standing “by reason of” requirement of §
1964(c). 35 Second, they began to focus on the “enterprise” element of §
1962, especially when the plaintiff alleged that the enterprise was an
“association in fact” (as opposed to a formal business organization like a
corporation or partnership). 36

Brunig v. Clark, 560 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 2009) (“In order to state a claim under RICO, a
plaintiff must allege, among other elements, the existence of an enterprise.”); In re
Burzynski, 989 F.2d 733, 741 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Thus, RICO claims under all four
subsections necessitate . . . an enterprise.”). But see United States v. Harris, 695 F.3d 1125,
1131 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding no enterprise required for a § 1962(d) conspiracy claim);
United States v. Applins, 637 F.3d 59, 75 (2d Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 813
(2011)(same).
32. E.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 494–96 (2d Cir. 1984), rev’d,
473 U.S. 479 (1985)(discussing an injury by reason of racketeering activity).
33. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
34. See generally Douglas E. Abrams, Civil RICO’s Cause of Action: The Landscape
After Sedima, 12 TUL. MAR. L.J. 19, 20–24 (1987) (describing the “explosion of civil RICO
litigation” after the Sedima decision); David A. Furlow, Civil RICO Comes to Texas: A
Review of Civil RICO Jurisprudence in the Fifth Circuit and in the Federal District Courts
of Texas, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 841, 852, 860 (1985)(same); John E. Grenier & Sally S.
Reilly, Civil RICO—The Scope of Coverage After Sedima, 47 ALA. LAW. 260, 260–61
(1986) (same); William H. Rivoir, III, Civil RICO—The Supreme Court Opens the Door to
Commercial Litigation, 90 COM. L.J. 621, 621–22 (1985)(same).
35. E.g., Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 477 (2006) (“[I]t [is] fair to
interpret the broad language ‘by reason of’ as meaning, in all civil RICO cases, that the
violation must be both the cause-in-fact and the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.”);
Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., 387 F.3d 721, 728–29 (8th Cir. 2004) (interpreting the “by
reason of” requirement to mean “causation under the traditional ‘tort requirements of
proximate or legal causation, as opposed to mere factual or ‘but for’ causation’” (quoting
Bieter Co. v. Blomquist, 987 F.2d 1319, 1325 (8th Cir. 1993))); see also Laura Gingera,
Causation and Civil RICO Standing: When is a Plaintiff Injured “by Reason of” a RICO
Violation?, 64 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 849, 850–51, 864–66 (1990) (discussing the various
interpretations by lower courts of the “by reason of” requirement after Sedima).
36. See, e.g., Bachman v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 178 F.3d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1999)
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TURKETTE, BOYLE, AND THE PROBLEM OF ASSOCIATION-INFACT ENTERPRISES

A. Foundational Principles: Turkette
Novia Turkette, Jr. and twelve others were charged with, among other
things, violating RICO § 1962(c) by operating an association-in-fact
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering that included drug trafficking,
arson, fraud, influencing state trials, and bribing police. 37 Turkette was
convicted and appealed to the First Circuit, arguing that RICO “was
intended to protect legitimate business enterprises from being preyed upon
and taken over by racketeers.” 38 And, since the association in fact was
“completely criminal,” “RICO does not apply.” 39 After an exhaustive
reading of the statute and its legislative history (which we will consider
below), the First Circuit agreed and held that a wholly criminal enterprise
did not fit within the definition set forth in § 1961(4). 40
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that:
[t]here is no restriction upon the associations embraced by
the definition: an enterprise includes any union or group of
individuals associated in fact. On its face, the definition appears
to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises within its
scope; it no more excludes criminal enterprises than it does
legitimate ones. Had Congress not intended to reach criminal
associations, it could easily have narrowed the sweep of the
definition by inserting a single word, “legitimate.” But it did
nothing to indicate that an enterprise consisting of a group of
individuals was not covered by RICO if the purpose of the
enterprise was exclusively criminal. 41
(finding that although defendants were involved in a conspiracy, “it is not an enterprise
unless every conspiracy is also an enterprise for RICO purposes, which the case law
denies”); Crowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 205 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[A]ssociation-in-fact
enterprise 1) must have an existence separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering, 2)
must be an ongoing organization and 3) its members must function as a continuing unit as
shown by a hierarchical or consensual decision making structure.”); Elliott v. Foufas, 867
F.2d 877, 881 (5th Cir. 1989) (requiring plaintiffs to “plead specific facts which establish
that the association exists for purposes other than simply to commit the predicate acts”).
37. United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 897 (1st Cir. 1980).
38. Id. at 898.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 899.
41. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580–81 (1981). One of the leading
commentators labels the Court’s positions as “absurd,” failing to “concede the obvious,” and
otherwise inadequate. DAVID B. SMITH & TERRANCE G. REED, CIVIL RICO ¶ 3.02[4]
(Matthew Bender 2013) [hereinafter SMITH & REED].
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Although it framed its reasoning for this conclusion in terms of
language, statutory structure, and legislative history, one leaves the opinion
with an abiding sense that the Court made a policy decision to read §
1961(4) broadly. We see traces of this in the passages considering the
consequences of the First Circuits holding: e.g., “[w]hole areas of
organized criminal activity would be placed beyond the substantive reach
of the enactment.” 42 But, as Lawrence Solan astutely observed, “it is
wrong to say that ‘enterprise’ could not be understood to include only
legitimate businesses. Generally speaking, that is how the word is used,
and the statute’s definition is not really very helpful.” 43
B. The Latest Word: Boyle
In 2009, the Supreme Court revisited its holding in Turkette and
“clarified” it in a way that broadened the scope of associations-in-fact
beyond the scope that had persisted in many lower courts for decades. 44
Boyle arrived at the Supreme Court framed as a disagreement over the
adequacy of a jury instruction given in a criminal RICO trial. 45 The
instruction at issue purported to set forth the standards for establishing the
“enterprise” element of a RICO claim through an “association in fact.” 46
For purposes of deciding the case, the Court stated the question presented
as “whether an association-in-fact enterprise must have ‘an ascertainable
structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in
which it engages.’” 47 For an answer, the Court offered the oracular
statement that “such an enterprise must have a ‘structure’ but that an
instruction framed in this precise language is not necessary.” 48 What is
necessary is something still being sorted out in the lower courts, but there is
no doubt that the Court’s reasoning leading up to the holding will prove
challenging to the tried-and-true defense that an association-in-fact
enterprise must look much different from a conspiracy.
After Turkette, lower courts were left to wonder whether the range of
“illegitimate” associations in fact could cover something like an ordinary
“conspiracy” or whether something more complicated like the Mafia was

42. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 589.
43. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 79 (1993) [hereinafter SOLAN].
44. See Gordon, Clarity and Confusion, supra note 27, at 701–08 (describing the
impact that the Boyle decision had on the RICO issue). The discussion of Boyle that follows
here is an abbreviated, updated, and lightly edited version of this article.
45. Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 942–43 (2009).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 945.
48. Id. at 941.

GORDON_FINAL (ARTICLE 1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

984

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

8/28/2014 2:24 PM

[Vol. 16.4

required. 49 Most lower courts thought that it meant the latter and
developed standards for identifying true “associations”—i.e., gangs that
shared at least something of the Mafia’s structure of dons, capos, wiseguys,
etc. 50 Accordingly, many courts held that an association-in-fact enterprise
must have an existence separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering,
be an ongoing organization, and function as a continuing unit as shown by
a hierarchical or consensual decision making structure. 51
In Boyle, the Court opined that the question before it (“whether an
association-in-fact enterprise must have ‘an ascertainable structure beyond
that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it
engages[]’”) 52 required three separate inquiries: “First, must an associationin-fact enterprise have a ‘structure’? Second, must the structure be
‘ascertainable’? Third, must the ‘structure’ go ‘beyond that inherent in the
pattern of racketeering activity’ in which its members engage?” 53 The
Court agreed that an association in fact must have a structure. 54 But to
define that structure, the Court simply turned to an ordinary dictionary and
picked a generic definition: “[i]n the sense relevant here, the term
‘structure’ means ‘[t]he way in which parts are arranged or put together to
form a whole’ and ‘[t]he interrelation or arrangement of parts in a complex
entity.’” 55 Against this standard, then, an association-in-fact enterprise
must have at least three features: “[1] a purpose, [2] relationships among
those associated with the enterprise, and [3] longevity sufficient to permit
these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” 56 Once again, though,
and despite Turkette, not everyone agreed that the text of § 1961(4)
demands such a loose reading. Thus, Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006) (“[E]nterprise includes . . . any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”) (emphasis added).
50. See e.g., United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 770 (3d Cir. 2005) (An enterprise
requires proof “(1) that the enterprise is an ongoing organization with some sort of
framework for making or carrying out decisions; (2) that the various associates function as a
continuing unit; and (3) that the enterprise be separate and apart from the pattern of activity
in which it engages.”) (quoting United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 2003));
United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 855 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding that an enterprise
requires “some continuity of structure and of personnel” and “an ascertainable structure
distinct from that inherent in the conduct of a pattern of racketeering activity”). But see,
e.g., United States v. Goldin Indus. Inc., 219 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that
an enterprise is “an association of individual entities, however loose or informal, that
furnishes a vehicle for the commission of two or more predicate crimes”).
51. Crowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 205 (5th Cir. 1995); Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n
Int’l AFL-CIO, 901 F.2d 404, 433 (5th Cir. 1990).
52. Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 945 (2009).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 945–46.
55. Id. (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1718 (4th ed. 2000)).
56. Id.
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that associations in fact can only be “business-like entities that have an
existence apart from the predicate acts committed by their employees or
associates.” 57
It is clear from the statute and our earlier decisions construing the term
that Congress used “enterprise” in these provisions in the sense of “a
business organization,” rather than “a ‘venture,’ ‘undertaking,’ or
‘project.’” First, the terms “individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity” describe entities with formal legal
structures most commonly established for business purposes. In context,
the subsequent reference to any “union or group of individuals associated
in fact although not a legal entity” reflects an intended commonality
between the legal and nonlegal entities included in the provision. “The
juxtaposition of the two phrases suggests that ‘associated in fact’ just
means structured without the aid of legally defined structural forms such as
the business corporation.” 58

57. Id. at 952 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 952–53 (citations omitted). To show the existence of an enterprise as a
separate RICO element, courts pre-Boyle would often hold that “[p]laintiffs . . . need to
‘plead specific facts which establish that the association exists for purposes other than
simply to commit the predicate acts.’” Rivera v. AT&T Corp., 141 F. Supp. 2d 719, 726
(S.D. Tex. 2001) (emphasis added). Some version of this rule may yet obtain, even though
Boyle has relaxed the standards for proving the structure of a RICO enterprise in the
criminal context. At least one court has gone so far as to limit Boyle to jury instructions
only. CIT Grp/ Equip. Fin., Inc. v. Krones, Inc., No. 9-432, 2009 WL 3579037, at *8 n.10
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2009) (“Defendants’ reliance on the Boyle decision for the proposition
that a plaintiff must plead structural features related to an association in fact enterprise [is]
misplaced. The Boyle court addressed the inadequacy of a jury instruction, not a
pleading.”). This is to say that a failure to show that the enterprise (as opposed to its
individual members) has a function other than to effectuate the alleged scheme may still be
fatal to a civil RICO claim. See, e.g., Tipton v. Northrop Grumman Corp., No. 08-1267,
2009 WL 2914365, at *12 (E.D. La. Sept. 2, 2009) (after noting Boyle, holding that the
plaintiffs’ failure “to allege the existence of an enterprise separate and apart from the pattern
of racketeering” “is fatal to [their] RICO claims”); Rivera, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 726
(“Plaintiffs’ allegations establish exactly the opposite: that any association between TeleCommunications, Inc., AT&T Corporation, and Time Warner, Inc. exists merely for the
purposes of providing cable services in exchange for a monthly fee.”). After Boyle,
however, some courts appear more willing to infer the existence of an enterprise “separate
and apart” from the racketeering activities, as suggested by the Court. See County of El
Paso v. Jones, No. EP-09-CV-00119-KC, 2009 WL 4730305, at *18 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 4,
2009) (giving an example of an enterprise that was found to be separate from racketeering
activities.). In County of El Paso, the court held that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the
existence of an enterprise “separate and apart” from the alleged racketeering activities, but
noted that even if the County failed to allege an existence separate and apart from
Defendants’ alleged racketeering activities, it is not clear that this would prove fatal to its
claim. Because Defendants’ “consulting services” organization functioned through its
commission of the predicate racketeering acts, the evidence establishing the association-infact and the pattern of racketeering activity in the instant case may ‘coalesce.’
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The majority disagreed and—over time—the greatest repercussions of
the case will no doubt be felt in the “beyond that inherent in the pattern of
racketeering activity” issue. 59 The Court suggested:
This phrase may be interpreted in least two different ways, and its
correctness depends on the particular sense in which the phrase is
used. If the phrase is interpreted to mean that the existence of an
enterprise is a separate element that must be proved, it is of
course correct. . . . On the other hand, if the phrase is used to
mean that the existence of an enterprise may never be inferred
from the evidence showing that persons associated with the
enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, it is
incorrect. 60
With one stroke, then, the Court eviscerated the holdings of scores of
cases in which lower courts had held that there must be a sharp distinction
between the alleged associational enterprise and the predicate acts. 61 And,
among other things, the Court may well have undermined a good many
cases holding that a mere “conspiracy” is not the same as an association-infact enterprise. 62 Nonetheless, there are still good reasons (even within

Id. (citing Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 947 (2009)). But even if not, Boyle leaves
no doubt that an actionable association-in-fact enterprise must exhibit at least two district
characteristics: namely, that it is an “ongoing organization” that functions as a “continuing
unit.” See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 951 (2009) (defining the nature of an
association in fact enterprise).
59. Boyle, 556 U.S. at 947.
60. Id.
61. E.g., Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 804–05 (7th Cir.
2008) (holding that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to identify the structure of an alleged
enterprise, and “[w]ithout a requirement of structure, ‘enterprise’ collapses to
‘conspiracy’”); Walker v. Jackson Pub. Sch., 42 Fed. App’x 735, 737–38 (6th Cir. 2002)
(affirming district court’s dismissal due to a lack of evidence of chain of command or
hierarchy); VanDenBroeck v. CommonPoint Mortg. Co., 210 F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir. 2000),
abrogated on other grounds by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639
(2008)) (plaintiff must show formal or informal association as part of a continuing unit
separate and apart from the commission of racketeering activity); Stephens, Inc. v.
Geldermann, Inc., 962 F.2d 808, 815–16 (8th Cir. 1992) (agreeing with the district court that
the plaintiff “failed to allege an enterprise distinct from the alleged pattern of racketeering
activity” because “[t]he only common factor that linked all these parties together
and defined them as a distinct group was their direct or indirect participation in [the
defendant’s] scheme to defraud [the plaintiff]”); Ocean Energy II, Inc. v. Alexander &
Alexander, Inc., 868 F.2d 740, 748 (5th Cir. 1989) (an enterprise must be an entity separate
and apart from the pattern in which it engages). But see Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d
541, 549–51 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the circuit split and finding that an associated-in-fact
enterprise “does not require any particular organization structure, separate or otherwise”).
62. See Boyle, 556 U.S. at 950 (“Finally, while in practice the elements of a violation
of §§1962(c) and (d) are similar, this overlap would persist even if petitioner’s conception
of an association-in-fact enterprise were accepted.”); id. at 957 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“By
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Boyle) to believe that an ordinary civil conspiracy should not qualify for
treatment as an enterprise. 63 After all, Boyle ran a gang of bank robbers.
This fits comfortably within even a lay view of a criminal enterprise. But
that is not what one typically sees in a civil RICO case. 64 There, more
often than not, the alleged association in fact is a group of corporations (or
corporations and individuals), not a “gang.” 65
III.

POST-BOYLE DECISIONS

Although post-Boyle cases will need to percolate for several years in
the lower courts before anything like a consensus on its ultimate meaning
emerges, the two following cases, which are representative in many
respects, reveal the types of problems that Boyle is likely to cause in civil
litigation. Once those cases are closely read, we will examine the deep
interpretative issues behind these problems. At that point, we will be
poised to take up the task of actually interpreting § 1961(4) to see if it
supports a reading that would include a corporation as part of an
association in fact.
A. The “Contingent Commission” Cases
In what is probably the most significant post-Boyle civil case, the
Third Circuit released a long-awaited opinion in the matter popularly

permitting the Government to prove [pattern and enterprise] with the same evidence, the
Court renders the enterprise requirement essentially meaningless in association-in-fact
cases. It also threatens to make that category of § 1962(c) offenses indistinguishable from
conspiracies to commit predicate acts, as the only remaining difference is § 1962(c)’s
pattern requirement.”); see e.g., Bachman v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 178 F.3d 930, 932
(7th Cir. 1999) (mere conspiracy to commit racketeering not sufficient to establish
association-in-fact enterprise, rather some formal or informal organizational structure apart
from the alleged conspiracy to defraud is required).
63. See, e.g., Bachman, 178 F.3d at 932 (“That is a conspiracy, but it is not an
enterprise unless every conspiracy is also an enterprise for RICO purposes, which the case
law denies.”); see also Boyle, 556 U.S. at 950 (“Section 1962(c) demands much more [than
proof of an ordinary conspiracy]: the creation of an ‘enterprise’—a group with a common
purpose and course of conduct—and the actual commission of a pattern of predicate
offenses.”).
64. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing Private RICO litigation).
65. E.g., Ouwinga v. Benistar 419 Plan Servs., Inc., 694 F.3d 783, 787 (6th Cir. 2012)
(insurance companies, law firms, lawyers, and insurance agents found to be a RICO
enterprise), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2735 (May 28, 2013); United States v. Console, 13 F.3d
641, 652 (3d Cir.1993) (holding an association-in-fact RICO enterprise existed between a
law firm and a medical practice), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1076 (1994); United States v.
Blinder, 10 F.3d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir.1993) (holding a group or union consisting solely of
corporations or other legal entities can constitute an “associated in fact” enterprise).
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known as the “Contingent Commission” cases. 66 The facts of the
Contingent Commission cases are difficult to capsule, but the overarching
allegation is that a group of insurance brokers conspired to funnel their
clients to co-conspiring insurers, which benefited each of the parties in
particular ways. 67 The insurers “bid” for insurance business but were
insulated from competition through devices like the submission of dummy
offers. 68 The brokers benefited because the insurers paid them “contingent
commissions” based on the volume of business steered their way. 69 The
insured customers suffered offsetting detriments–they paid premiums that
were both rigged and surreptitiously larded with the contingent
commissions. 70 Against this backdrop, the plaintiffs claimed Sherman and
RICO Act violations, as well as state-law claims. 71
The plaintiffs brought their RICO claims under two subsections of the
Act, §§ 1962(c) and (d). 72 Section 1962(c), as we have already noted,
makes it unlawful “for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise . . . to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . .” 73
Section 1962(d) makes it unlawful “for any person to conspire to violate” §
1962(c). 74 The defendants’ arguments were that the plaintiffs (1) had not
pled a cognizable enterprise, (2) had not adequately alleged that the
defendants had “conducted” the affairs of an enterprise, and (3) did not
identify a “pattern of racketeering acts.” 75 And because the § 1962(c)
claim failed, the § 1962(d) claim—because it is derivative—failed
automatically. 76 The Third Circuit took most of these issues up in turn, but
left the “pattern” arguments for later decision by the district court.
1. The Alleged Enterprises
The Contingent Commission plaintiffs alleged both types of enterprise
defined in § 1961(4) (i.e., legal entities like corporations and partnerships
and less formal “associations in fact”). 77 The first category consisted of

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Lit., 618 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 308.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 308.
Id.
Id. at 309.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006).
Id. § 1962(d).
In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 364 (3d Cir. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 363.
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“broker-centered” enterprises—i.e., each defendant broker and its insurerpartners made up a separate enterprise. 78 The plaintiffs also alleged that a
formal legal entity, a trade association called the Council of Insurance
Agents and Brokers (CIAB), was an enterprise. 79 The Third Circuit looked
at each category separately, and did so in the context of important recent
developments at the United States Supreme Court, both procedural and
substantive. First, the court confirmed that Twombly’s heightened pleading
standard applies not just in antitrust cases but to RICO cases as well and—
more important—to pleading the “enterprise” element. 80 Second, the court
acknowledged that the Boyle case significantly relaxed the standard for
establishing an association-in-fact enterprise. 81 Reading these cases
together, the court stated that “it is clear after Twombly that a RICO claim
must plead facts plausibly implying the existence of an enterprise with the
structural attributes identified in Boyle: a shared ‘purpose, relationships
among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to
permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.’” 82

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 369–70; see also Rao v. BP Products N. Am., Inc., 589 F.3d 389, 400 (7th
Cir. 2009) (finding boilerplate allegations of an association-in-fact enterprise failed to
satisfy Twombly’s heightened pleading standard); Smartix Int’l Corp. v. MasterCard Int’l
LLC, 355 Fed. Appx. 464, 466 (2d Cir. 2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff
must sufficiently plead [the required elements for a § 1962(c) violation] to meet the
standards set forth in Twombly and Iqbal.”); Ozbakir v. Scotti, 764 F. Supp. 2d 556, 570
(W.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Plaintiffs’ attempt to transform this single scheme of limited duration
into a RICO enterprise, by broadly alleging that multiple acts of racketeering took place
during the scheme, fails to meet the RICO pleading standards, particularly under Twombly
and Iqbal.”); Jackson v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 09-11529, 2010 WL
931864, at *22–25 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 11, 2010) (“Although Plaintiffs allege a number of
different possible enterprises, they have not arguably alleged one plausible enterprise.”); see
generally Gross v. Waywell, 628 F. Supp. 2d 475, 494–95 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Plaintiffs’
reliance on ‘mail and/or wire fraud’ as the predicate offenses, by operation of Twombly’s
plausibility test and the particularity requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b)(‘Rule 9(b)’), demands greater specificity in the pleadings. Such particularity would
require more details regarding the alleged predicate acts in which each particular defendant
was directly or indirectly involved or had responsibility, as well as information concerning
where, when and by which defendant any representations involved in the alleged fraudulent
scheme constituting deception of Plaintiffs were communicated by use of the mail and/or
wires, and how such statements actually deceived Plaintiffs.”). The court in Gross also
analyzed 145 reported decisions of civil RICO claims from 2004 to 2007 and found that of
the thirty-six cases resolved on the merits, thirty were dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), three
by the court sua sponte, and three under Rule 56; all decisions appealed to the Second
Circuit were affirmed. Id. at 480.
81. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d at 368.
82. Id. at 369–70.
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Associations in Fact—The broker-centered enterprises

As noted above, the plaintiffs alleged six associations in fact, each
consisting of a broker and the network of insurers with whom it had formed
a “strategic partnership.” The plaintiffs’ position was that—at the pleading
stage—they were required to do no more than identify the members of each
alleged enterprise. 83 The Third Circuit disagreed, and used a somewhat
novel analysis. First, it suggested that “[t]he enterprise element of RICO
claims is a close analogue of [Sherman Act] § 1’s agreement element.” 84
Second, it applied this logic to the plaintiffs’ enterprise allegations and
found them—with one exception discussed below—wanting because a
mere hub-and-spoke association or conspiracy allegation is insufficient,
absent an enclosing rim of horizontal associations or agreements:
In our analysis of the antitrust claims, we determined that, with
the exception of the alleged Marsh-centered commercial
conspiracy, the facts alleged in the complaints do not plausibly
imply a horizontal agreement among the insurer-partners. In
seeking to establish a “rim” enclosing the insurer-partners in the
alleged RICO enterprises, plaintiffs rely on the same allegations
we found deficient in the antitrust context: that each insurer
entered into a similar contingent-commission agreement in order
to become a “strategic partner” [and undertook other agreements
with the broker]. . . . As noted, these allegations do not plausibly
imply concerted action—as opposed to merely parallel conduct—
by the insurers, and therefore cannot provide a “rim” enclosing
the “spokes” of these alleged “hub-and-spoke” enterprises. 85
Thus, the Third Circuit concluded, “[e]ven under the relatively
undemanding standard of Boyle, these allegations do not adequately plead
an association-in-fact enterprise. They fail the basic requirement that the
components function as a unit, that they ‘be put together to form a
whole.’” 86
The Third Circuit did, however, reach a different conclusion with
respect to the “Marsh-centered enterprise.” 87 The principal difference was
factual—namely, the plaintiffs had pled (and provided evidence) that the
insurer-defendants associated with Marsh had rigged bids, which added a
This was buttressed by
horizontal dimension to the enterprise. 88

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 369.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 374.
Id.
Id. at 375.
Id.
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allegations, for example, of a hierarchical structure under which Marsh
created a “brokering plan” with which it would decide which insurers
would submit sham bids on which transactions. 89 All this, in the court’s
view, was sufficient to push the Marsh-centered enterprise well over the
Boyle line. 90
ii.

Legal entity—The CIAB Enterprise

The Third Circuit quickly agreed with the district court that “CIAB, a
legal entity, was an enterprise.” 91 The plaintiffs’ argument with respect to
CIAB was that CIAB afforded an “opportunity” or “forum” for defendants
to plan and advance their schemes. 92 But the court held that “[a]vailing
oneself of a forum provided by an enterprise does not, without more,
plausibly imply that one has participated in the conduct of that enterprise’s
affairs.” 93 The court did note, nonetheless, that the complaint could
reasonably be read to allege facts that presented a “closer question.” 94
Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants had used the CIAB’s
“institutional machinery” to formulate strategy and issue statements that
furthered the alleged fraudulent acts. 95 These allegations raised other legal
issues under RICO that had not been squarely addressed on appeal, so the
court vacated the dismissal and commended them to the district court for
evaluation. 96
iii. The Marsh-centered enterprise
In one of the (relatively few) troubling holdings in the case, the Third
Circuit found a sufficient nexus between the defendants’ acts and the
conduct of the enterprise. 97 In reasoning that appears circular, the court
89. Id. at 375–76.
90. Id. at 376. The court noted that “[i]n at least one sense, plaintiffs’ allegations
regarding the ‘Marsh-centered enterprise’ exceed[ed] Boyle’s requirements,” since the
plaintiffs had alleged an organized, hierarchical structure while Boyle had allowed a
“loosely and informally organized” enterprise. Id. (quoting Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S.
938, 941 (2009)).
91. Id. at 379.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 381.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 381–83. The Court also vacated the dismissal of the § 1962(d) claims to the
extent that they were based on the two enterprises that survived appeal. Id. at 383.
97. Id. at 378–79. The court stated that “[m]ere association with an enterprise does not
violate § 1962(c). To be liable under this provision, a defendant must ‘conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern
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stated that
[i]t will often be the case that the interests of the enterprise are
congruent with those of its members; such congruence
presumably provides the incentive for members to participate in
the enterprise. We think, therefore, that “if defendants band
together to commit [violations] they cannot accomplish alone . . .
then they cumulatively are conducting the association-in-fact
enterprise’s affairs, and not [simply] their own affairs.” 98
Against this low standard, the court had no trouble finding that the
plaintiffs cleared it: “defendants’ alleged collaboration in the Marshcentered enterprise, most notably the bid rigging, allowed them to deceive
insurance purchasers in a way not likely without such collusion”; these
activities constitute “participation in the conduct of the enterprise.” 99
B. Gonzalez v. Bank of America Insurance Services
In Gonzalez v. Bank of America Insurance Services, the plaintiff sued
nine legal entities for fraud based RICO violations on behalf of a
nationwide class. 100 He also named the nine defendants as an associationin-fact enterprise. 101 In his pleading, Gonzalez alleged that he was a
Mexican immigrant who opened an account at Bank of America. 102 The
gravamen of his complaint was that the defendants engaged in a widereaching scheme to illegally sell inferior insurance products to Bank of
America customers. 103
In his amended complaint, Gonzalez first alleged that Bank of
America identified lower-income Spanish-speaking customers as potential

of racketeering activity.’” Id. at 370–71 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006)). This
“conduct” element “requires a defendant to ‘have some part in directing those affairs.’” Id.
at 371 (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 179 (1993)). In other words, a
defendant must have “participated in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.”
Id. (quoting Reves, 507 U.S. at 183). Defendants argued that Plaintiffs had not made this
showing with respect to either the Marsh-centered enterprise or CIAB.
98. Id. at 378 (emphasis in original)(quoting Gregory P. Joseph, CIVIL RICO: A
DEFINITIVE GUIDE 332 (3d ed. 2010)).
99. Id. In a footnote, the Court undercut its holding by stating, “[w]hether plaintiffs
have adequately alleged that defendants participated in the conduct of the Marsh-centered
enterprise’s affairs ‘through a pattern of racketeering activity’ is, of course, another matter.”
Id. at n.79. One could argue that it is not “another matter” but is the heart of the matter.
100. Gonzalez v. Bank of Am. Ins. Servs., Inc., 454 Fed. App’x 295, 297 (5th Cir.
2011). By way of disclosure, I was one of counsel in the District Court proceedings.
101. Gonzalez v. Bank of Am., Civil Action H-09-2946, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16963,
at *19–20 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2011).
102. Gonzalez, 454 Fed. App’x at 296–97.
103. Id. at 297.
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targets and then conveyed information about these customers to one or
more of the other defendants. 104 Gonzalez claimed this information transfer
violated the deposit agreement (via a privacy policy incorporated by
reference) that customers sign with the bank when they open their
accounts. 105 Once the customer information was in hand, a telemarketing
company, often one of the defendants, contacted the targeted individuals
and offered them death and disability insurance. 106 These telemarketers
purportedly used “misleading sales techniques, such as misrepresenting the
premium and coverage amounts, the availability of coverage, acting as
though they were affiliated with Bank of America, and enrolling
individuals despite only receiving a request for more information.” 107 In
any event, according to plaintiff, the issued insurance policies were
underwritten by one of the affiliated insurer defendants and were inferior
and overpriced. 108 As a result of these business practices, Gonzalez alleged
that he and other potential class members were damaged by the amount of
money that was electronically withdrawn from their bank accounts, or by
the amount the premiums exceeded the actual value of the insurance. 109
As the Fifth Circuit noted, although the plaintiff alleged “a litany of
allegations about the general business practices of the various Defendants,”
he said almost nothing about his own interactions with the defendant
companies, or about anything that any of the defendants did to him. 110
Indeed, all he alleged about his situation was that he opened a bank account
at the bank on an undisclosed date, that a telemarketer contacted him and
persuaded him to purchase insurance, and that premium withdrawals were
taken from his account. 111
The district court dismissed the RICO claim on multiple grounds. 112
With respect to the enterprise element, the court applied pre-Boyle Fifth
Circuit law that required a plaintiff to plead “facts showing that . . . [the
enterprise] (a) has an existence separate and apart from the pattern of
racketeering, (b) is an ongoing organization, and (c) functions as a
continuing unit as shown by a hierarchical or consensual decision making
structure.” 113 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit took a broader tack and—after

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Gonzalez v. Bank of Am., No. H-09-2946, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16963, at *15–
21 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2011).
113. Id. at *20 (citing Crowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 205 (5th Cir. 1995)).
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agreeing that there was no personal jurisdiction over one of the nine
defendants—held that, among other things, Gonzalez failed to make out a
cognizable case for the fraud upon which he predicated his case:
In its opinion dismissing the amended complaint, the district
court found that Plaintiff-Appellant Gonzalez failed to state a
claim because he did not make any individual allegations and
because the conduct alleged to have been taken against him is not
actionable. Having reviewed the record below and the briefing
on appeal, we find no error in the district court’s decision to
dismiss Gonzalez’s claims on the merits under Rules 9(b) and
12(b)(6). As noted by the district court, Gonzalez’s amended
complaint contains almost no allegations about events or actions
affecting him. Although the amended complaint is replete with
generalized allegations of wrongful conduct, Gonzalez fails to
allege facts indicating that Defendants-Appellees acted in an
actionable manner towards him personally. Because Gonzalez
does not allege that he personally is entitled to any relief, we also
agree with the district court’s ruling that Gonzalez fails to
adequately state a claim against the remaining DefendantsAppellees. 114
The district court saw the case as a “waste of the public’s and
defendant’s resources,” 115 an attempt to “RICO-ize” 116 an ordinary
commercial relationship: “Gonzalez’s complaint is a 32-page mask of
conclusion to cover its emptiness. It is unorganized, imprecise, and
contradictory—amounting to nothing more than a populist press release to
reap rewards from an ordinary, proper consumer relationship that he and
others may have made.” 117 But what if, hypothetically, Gonzalez had been
able to show facts as to who, what, when, where, and why that were
sufficient to state a fraud claim? Under Boyle, the district court’s analysis
of the enterprise would be found wanting, although—as I have argued
elsewhere with respect to a case presenting similar facts 118—the Gonzalez

114. Gonzalez, 454 Fed. App’x at 301.
115. Gonzalez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16963, at *25.
116. Justice Breyer used this verbalization at oral argument in Mohawk Industries, Inc.
v. Williams to describe the consequences of reading “group of corporation” into § 1961(4).
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 547 U.S. 516
(2006) (No. 05-465), 2006 WL 1194498, at *44 [hereinafter Mohawk Transcript] (providing
transcript of the oral argument before the Supreme Court).
117. Gonzalez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16963, at *25.
118. Gordon, Clarity and Confusion, supra note 27, at 711–15. The Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Crichton v. Golden Rule Ins. Co. is also illustrative of the problems inherent in
open-ended or otherwise casually stated associational enterprise allegations. 576 F.3d 392
(7th Cir. 2009). In Golden Rule, the plaintiff purchased insurance under a “master policy”
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enterprise should still fail. 119 But should courts and defendants even have
to face and fend off a RICO case built on the sands of an enterprise
consisting solely of corporate entities?

offered to members of a consumer and traveler organization (the “Federation”). Id. at 394.
He later sued the insurer, Golden Rule, on behalf of a nationwide class; the gist of his
claims—which included a RICO claim—was that Golden Rule did not adequately disclose
the cost of his premiums. Id. at 394–95. In connection with his RICO claim the plaintiff
alleged, alternatively, that Golden Rule and the Federation constituted an association-infact. Id. at 398–99. The Court was unpersuaded, holding that “an association-in-fact
enterprise must be meaningfully distinct from the entities that comprise it such that the
entity sought to be held liable can be said to have controlled and conducted the enterprise
rather than its own affairs.” Id. at 399. Indeed, the plaintiff had “done no more than
describe the ordinary operation of a garden-variety marketing arrangement between Golden
Rule and the Federation” which “is not what RICO penalizes.” Id. at 400. Accordingly, the
Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s theory, holding that “[t]his is insufficient to state a
RICO claim based on an association-in-fact enterprise.” Id.; see also In re McCann, 268 F.
App’x 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating that members of alleged association-in-fact were
“merely partners in a scheme”); Warnock v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 833 F. Supp.
2d 604, 612 (S.D. Miss. 2011) (finding that law firm improperly filing subrogation claims
on behalf of insurance company was company’s agent and relationship existed solely to
commit predicate acts); Gray v. Upchurch, No. 5:05-cv-210-KS-MTP, 2007 WL 2258906,
at *4 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007) (holding that allegation that mortgage lenders “knew or
should have known” that loans they made were part of fraudulent scheme was insufficient to
establish existence of or control over enterprise); Do v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 512 F. Supp.
2d 764, 769 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (concluding that “standard business arrangements” between
agribusiness and bank did not constitute “continuous RICO enterprise”). Cf. Negrete v.
Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. CV 05-6838 CAS MANX, 2011 WL 4852314, at *8
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) (finding Golden Rule Ins. Co. inapposite because insurance
company Allianz’s coordination with and control over insurance marketing organizations far
exceeded the mere ‘conduit’ scenario alleged in Golden Rule).
119. Even if a plaintiff sufficiently pleads the existence of an enterprise, his § 1962(c)
RICO claims will still fail if he does not allege that the “defendants conducted or
participated in the conduct of the ‘enterprises’ affairs,’ not just their own affairs.” Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993). This requires the plaintiff to plead and prove
that each of the defendants participated in the “operation” or “management” of the
enterprise to the degree that it has “some part in directing the enterprise’s affairs.” Id. at
179; see Able Sec. and Patrol, LLC. v. Louisiana, 569 F. Supp. 2d 617, 629 (E.D. La. 2008)
(holding that plaintiff must plead “how each of these defendants performed acts in
furtherance of the enterprise.”). This requires “more than ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action,’” which—as noted above—is insufficient under Twombly.
Watts v. Allstate Indem. Co., No. S-08-1877 LKK/GHH, 2009 WL 1905047, at *6 (E.D.
Cal. Jul. 1, 2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). It
stretches the RICO fabric too far to suggest—as did the Gonzalez plaintiff—that merely
providing a service through a marketing arrangement with otherwise unrelated corporate
groups constitutes the “conduct” of an enterprise. One reason that this element would fail
with respect to the insurer in cases like Gonzalez or Golden Rule is that the acts alleged
against it—namely selling insurance and collecting a premium—have no “nexus” with the
management or operation of the alleged enterprise.
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C. Special Problems under § 1962(c) in the Civil Context
By interpreting the definition of “association in fact” broadly, Boyle
effectively eliminated one of the most potent tools available to the lower
courts for sorting actionable RICO sheep from non-actionable goats. The
problem becomes acute in civil litigation because, to fix liability under §
1962(c), a plaintiff “must allege and prove the existence of two distinct
entities: (1) a ‘person’; and (2) an ‘enterprise’ that is not simply the same
‘person’ referred to by a different name.” 120 This means that a
corporation—even a corporation that is guilty of conducting its affairs
through a pattern of racketeering—cannot be sued or prosecuted under
RICO because of the statutorily required person-enterprise distinction. 121
This poses a problem for plaintiffs in civil litigation that is not so
pronounced in criminal proceedings. This is so because the Government is
usually interested in convicting and imprisoning individuals in RICO cases,
whereas a civil plaintiff is interested in recovering money damages. 122
Thus so, the Government is often satisfied with indicting individuals who
operate or manage a corporate enterprise through a pattern of racketeering.
But a civil plaintiff usually needs the corporate entity to be a defendant
because it has the deepest pockets, so there is a temptation to name the
corporation as a defendant and part of an association in fact.
In the most common manifestation of the problem, a plaintiff tries to
name a corporation as the defendant and part of an association-in-fact

120. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161 (2001).
121. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006) (stating that the accused “person” (i.e., defendant)
must be “employed by or associated with” the named enterprise).
122. For example, Government prosecutors are tethered by specific “RICO guidelines.”
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-110.010 to .900
(1999),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/110mcrm.htm.
These
guidelines state that “[t]he purpose of the RICO statute is ‘the elimination of the infiltration
of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate
commerce.’” Id. § 9-110.100. They also reemphasize the principle that the primary
responsibility for enforcing state laws rests with the state concerned. Despite the broad
statutory language of RICO and the legislative intent that the statute “. . . shall be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purpose,” it is the policy of the Criminal Division that
RICO be selectively and uniformly used. It is the purpose of these guidelines to make it
clear that not every proposed RICO charge that meets the technical requirements of a RICO
violation will be approved. Further, the Criminal Division will not approve “imaginative”
prosecutions under RICO which are far afield from the congressional purpose of the RICO
statute. A RICO count which merely duplicates the elements of proof of traditional Hobbs
Act, Travel Act, mail fraud, wire fraud, gambling or controlled substances cases, will not be
approved unless it serves some special RICO purpose.
Id. at 9-110.200. Accordingly, the guidelines go on to state that a RICO charge is
appropriate only if it meets one or more of seven narrowly cast criteria. Id. § 9-110.310.
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enterprise consisting of the corporation and various employees, agents, and
affiliates. 123 These amalgamations have been met with varying success in
the lower courts. 124 Courts have been particularly harsh with putative
enterprises consisting of a corporation and its employees, and—following
Kushner—all the circuits have erected some sort of person-enterprise
pleading barrier. 125 These holdings, coupled with pre-Boyle structural
requirements, made it difficult for plaintiffs to bring ordinary commercialfraud cases under RICO. But now, with Boyle so definitively removing a
key weapon for combating the “RICO-izing” of such claims, it makes good
sense to reconsider whether a corporation—defendant or not—can be part
of an association-in-fact enterprise. For if the Supreme Court is going to
read the association-in-fact text of RICO in a literal way when looking at
the issue of whether an association of individuals needs to have a structure
or purpose beyond committing predicate acts, then it should at least
consider whether consistency demands that it read that same text in a literal
way when determining if a corporation can be part of an associational
enterprise. To that very question we now turn.
IV.

INTERPRETING § 1961(4)

It often seems as if there are as many approaches to interpretation as
there are texts to interpret. But the various approaches that have been
offered to interpret § 1961(4) sort neatly into the categories suggested by a
topology outlined by Neil MacCormick: linguistic, systemic, and
teleological-evaluative arguments (all of which can be suffused with
intentional arguments). 126 Linguistic arguments often come packaged, as
one would suspect, as appeals to “plain meaning” or “ordinary
language.” 127 Systemic arguments seek meaning by evaluating particular
text-bites in a larger context, perhaps in other sections of a statute, an entire

123. See, e.g., Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd., 533 U.S. at 164 (holding that the
president and sole shareholder of the corporation was a “person” separate from the
enterprise).
124. Compare Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1284–85 (11th Cir.
2006) (involving a corporation and its recruiters formed actionable enterprise) with
Atkinson v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 808 F.2d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that
defendant bank plus its holding company and three employees not sufficiently distinct).
125. See Caroline N. Mitchell et. al., Returning Rico to Racketeers: Corporations
Cannot Constitute an Associated-in-Fact Enterprise Under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4), 13
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 28 (2008) [hereinafter Mitchell et al.] (explaining how
pleading barriers have been placed).
126. NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL
REASONING 124–25 (2005) [hereinafter MACCORMICK].
127. Id. at 125.
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statutory title, or other aspects of a whole legal system. 128 Teleologicalevaluative arguments focus on the consequences of rival interpretations and
try to match the preferred interpretation with particular salutary social ends
or values. 129 And, as already noted, each of these techniques will
necessarily invoke (or claim to demonstrate) the “intent” of the legislature
in choosing particular words, leaving out particular words, and so forth. 130
A. Linguistic Arguments
Because we can never be certain what a legislature meant, we are left
to ponder what it said. Here, Congress said that a RICO “‘enterprise’
includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not
a legal entity.” 131 Before diving into the competing lines of argument, it is
probably worthwhile to pause and consider what is not in dispute. That is,
there seems to be general agreement that any of the following can be an
“enterprise”: (1) an “individual,” (2) a “partnership,” (3) a “corporation,”
(4) an “association,” (5) any “other legal entity,” and a “group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” The principal
grammatical-linguistic arguments, then, turn on, first, whether “union” is
modified and limited by the prepositional phrase “of individuals associated
in fact although not a legal entity” (and, if not, whether “union” means
labor/trade union or something else) and, second, whether the entire list is
to be read as an illustrative or an exhaustive definition. We will look at
these issues in turn, but we first need to trace an earlier map of
(mis?)reading that may have brought us to this place to begin with.
1. Turkette and its interpretation of “enterprise”
As discussed above, in Turkette the Supreme Court took a position on
the scope of RICO in general and the “enterprise” definition in particular
that—though defensible—was not inevitable. 132 Congress’s declared
purpose in passing the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was “to seek
the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the
legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal

128. Id. at 127–32. MacCormick sub-categorizes systemic arguments in terms of (1)
contextual harmonization, (2) precedent, (3) analogy, (4) conceptual, (5) general principles,
and (6) history. Id.
129. Id. at 132–37.
130. Id. at 125.
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006).
132. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to
deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.” 133
Together, the eleven titles of the Act form these “legal tools;” three of
them, Titles VIII (interstate gambling), IX (RICO), and XI (distribution of
explosives), created new substantive offenses. 134 The point to be taken here
is that Congress did not just outlaw “organized crime” (the phrase remains
undefined in the Act); rather, it sought to craft procedures and remedies to
correct “defects” in existing law that allowed organized criminals to evade
prosecution. RICO was intended to remedy (at least) one of these defects.
There is no dispute that “the major purpose of Title IX is to address
the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime.” 135 The big
question, then, is whether that is its only purpose. 136 Most of the courts of
appeals that have taken up this question have found in the negative, holding
that—although RICO’s target may have been the corruption of legitimate
businesses—its ambit (as drawn by the statute’s language) stretched to
include illegitimate organizations. 137 But at least two courts—the Sixth
133. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923
(1970).
134. Id. §§ 803(a), 901(a), 1102(a).
135. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981).
136. Justice Thomas’ dissent in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. fairly represents a
major strain of concern, especially along RICO’s civil dimension:
Judicial sentiment that civil RICO’s evolution is undesirable is widespread.
Numerous justices have expressed dissatisfaction with either the breadth of
RICO’s application, Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 501 (1985)
(Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., dissenting) (“The
Court’s interpretation of the civil RICO statute quite simply revolutionizes
private litigation; it validates the federalization of broad areas of state common
law of frauds, and it approves the displacement of well-established federal
remedial provisions . . . . [T]here is no indication that Congress even considered,
much less approved, the scheme that the Court today defines”), or its general
vagueness at outlining the conduct it is intended to prohibit, H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 255–56 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor and Kennedy, JJ., concurring in
judgment) (“No constitutional challenge to this law has been raised in the
present case . . . . That the highest Court in the land has been unable to derive
from this statute anything more than today’s meager guidance bodes ill for the
day when that challenge is presented”).
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 471–72 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001, 1006–09 (6th Cir. 1980) (en
banc) (holding that RICO’s reach is not limited to legitimate enterprises only); United States
v. Errico, 635 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1980)(rejecting petitioner’s request to overturn
precedent applying RICO to both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises); United States v.
Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 992–93 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that “enterprise” under prior
precedent should be liberally construed, such that claims that an illegitimate enterprise can
fall under RICO’s reach, while noting five other circuits expressed similar opinions); United
States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 896–98 (5th Cir. 1978) (concluding that Congress intended
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Circuit in the Sutton panel opinion 138 and the First Circuit in Turkette 139—
found otherwise; the Eighth Circuit, though declining to rest its decision on
the legitimate/illegitimate distinction, reached a similar result by declaring
that an enterprise must be “a discrete economic association existing
separately from the racketeering activity.” 140 In Turkette, the Supreme
Court held with the majority of the courts of appeals and found that
“neither the language nor structure of RICO limits its application to
legitimate ‘enterprises.’” 141 None of this controls the interpretive question
of whether a corporation can be a member of an association in fact, but—
particularly when coupled with Boyle—it underscores how loath the
Supreme Court has been to interpret the enterprise definition in a way that
would limit RICO’s reach. One can speculate as to why this might be, but
the Court’s unwillingness to reject an interpretation of the statute that
provides so many advantages to the Government in its battle with
organized crime seems as good an explanation as any. 142 But it also
underscores how important the question of whether a corporation can be
part of an association in fact is for civil litigation: but-for the inclusion of
illegitimate organizations in the definition of enterprise, it would be
difficult for a plaintiff to name a corporation as a defendant and as part of
an association in fact because that association is typically alleged to do
“enterprise” to be construed liberally to include legitimate and illegitimate enterprises alike).
138. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 263-64 (6th Cir. 1979).
139. United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 898–99 (1st Cir. 1980).
140. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980). This holding
survived in one form or another until Boyle.
141. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981).
142. SMITH & REED, supra note 41, ¶ 3.02[1]. Justice Thomas highlights the other, civil,
side of the conundrum in his Anza dissent when he notes that, among other things, civil
RICO suits almost never turn on conduct that one would associate with Mafia-like behavior:
Congress plainly enacted RICO to address the problem of organized crime, and
not to remedy general state-law criminal violations. See H. J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S. 229, 245 (1989). There is some
evidence, to be sure, that the drafters knew that RICO would have the potential
to sweep more broadly than organized crime and did not find that problematic.
Id. at 246–248. Nevertheless, the Court has recognized that “in its private civil
version, RICO is evolving into something quite different from the original
conception of its enactors.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500
(1985). . . .This case, like the majority of civil RICO cases, has no apparent
connection to organized crime. See Sedima, 473 U. S. at 499, n.16 (quoting an
ABA Task Force determination that, over the period reviewed, only 9% of civil
RICO cases at the trial court level involved “‘allegations of criminal activity of
a type generally associated with professional criminals’”). Given the distance
the facts of this case lie from the prototypical organized criminal activity that
led to RICO’s enactment, it is tempting to find in the Act a limitation that will
keep at least this and similar cases out of court.
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 471–73 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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nothing other than illegal acts, even if the corporation itself is legitimate. 143
With these issues in mind, we can now turn to the matter at hand.
2. The Pro and Con of Plain Meaning Arguments
i.

Grammar and Syntax

At the outset, we must note that “plain meaning” analysis can take us
only so far. For as members of Congress complained at the time of its
consideration, RICO “embodies poor draftsmanship,” a complaint echoed
in many court decisions. 144 Nonetheless, the text is a convenient and
necessary starting point. In a nutshell, the argument against including
corporations in associations in fact is “that the use of ‘individual’ in
RICO’s definition of ‘enterprise’ refers only to a living person.” 145 But this
argument, though compelling at first light, must be unpacked and subjected
to full examination before it can be accepted. As an exemplar for the
various positions, I will refer to briefs and the oral argument in Mohawk
Industries v. Williams, a recent case presented to but not decided by the
United States Supreme Court. 146
First, so the argument goes, the term “individuals” means natural
persons, not corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies and the
like. Dictionary definitions of “individual,” which generally—though not
universally—articulate a distinction between single humans and social
groups, support this reading. 147 Second, this distinction seems to be
143. Plaintiffs do this because a corporation cannot be employed by or associated with
an enterprise if it is the enterprise, which is a required element of a § 1962(c) claim. See
Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 29–30 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting
that the same enterprise cannot simultaneously serve as a person engaging in racketeering
and the enterprise facilitating it cannot be one and the same). Thus, plaintiffs allege that the
corporation is the defendant and part of an association-in-fact to get around the personenterprise barrier and still keep the corporation in as the deep-pocket defendant.
144. H.R. REP. 91-1549, at 185 (1970) (dissenting views of Representative John
Conyers, Jr., Abner Mikva, and William Ryan); see, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492
U.S. 229, 249 (1989) (“RICO may be a poorly drafted statute; but rewriting it is a job for
Congress, if it is so inclined, and not for this Court.”).
145. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Boeing Co., 357 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1364 (M.D. Fla.
2005).
146. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 546 U.S. 1075 (2005) (granting certiorari).
The case was fully briefed and then argued, but the Court subsequently remanded the case
without decision for reconsideration in light of its opinion in Anza v. Ideal Supply Corp.,
547 U.S. 451 (2006). See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 547 U.S. 516, 516 (2006)
(dismissing the case as improvidently granted, and remanding the case in light of the Anza
decision to the eleventh circuit for further consideration).
147. Compare WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 615 (1986) (“a single
human being as contrasted with a social group or institution”) with BLACK’S LAW
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embodied in the structure of § 1961(4) itself, in that the first clause sets
forth a series that separately lists any “individual” and “corporation” as
legal types that serve as a RICO enterprise. 148 In other words, if
“individual” were intended to be a general type that includes
“corporations” as a subset, then there would be no need for both terms to be
included in the series—i.e., “corporation” would be superfluous, an
eventuality to be avoided under general principles of statutory
construction. 149
Thus, again under general principles of statutory
construction, if “individual” means “natural person” in the first clause, it
must mean the same thing in the second clause. 150 This is the position
articulated by at least two Justices at oral argument in Mohawk, and one
that the United States, as amicus, conceded 151:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: There may be no dispute about
it, but it does seem strange to encompass [corporations] under the
term individuals when the same statute uses individuals and
corporations separately. . . .
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Still, it—it—you know, we usually talk
about person can mean corporation. This says individual. A
person is defined in—in sub (3) just above it. A person includes
any individual or entity. Then the next thing says individual. So
DICTIONARY 788 (9th ed. 2009) (Individual means either “[e]xisting as an indivisible entity”
or “[o]f or relating to a single person or thing, as opposed to a group.”). Dictionaries from
the time of RICO’s adoption are to similar effect. See Brief for Petitioner at 12–13,
Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 547 U.S. 516 (2006) (No. 05-465), 2006 WL 282167, at
*12–13 [hereinafter Mohawk Petitioner’s Brief] (providing dictionary definitions of
“individuals” as part of an argument that corporations are not considered individuals).
148. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006) (providing a definition of “enterprise” for the
purposes of the statute).
149. See NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46:6, at 230-52 (7th ed. 2010) [hereinafter SINGER] (“A statute should be
construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
superfluous, void or insignificant . . . . No clause, sentence or word shall be construed as
superfluous, void or insignificant if a construction can be found which will give force to and
preserve all the words of the statute.”); see also Corley v. U.S., 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)
(“[O]ne of the most basic interpretive canons [is] that ‘[a] statute should be construed so that
effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant.’” (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004))).
150. See SINGER, supra note 149, § 46.6 at 249 (“The same words used twice in the
same act are presumed to have the same meaning.”); Gustafason v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S.
561, 569–70 (1995). There is a similar and larger structural argument made to the same
effect that is treated below. See infra Part IV.A.2.c.
151. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6,
Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 547 U.S. 516 (2006) (No. 05-465), 2006 WL 680358, at
*6 [hereinafter Mohawk United States Amicus Brief] (noting that “petitioners premise is
correct” with regards to the argument that a “corporation” is not an “individual” under
1964(c)).
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it’s not a—it doesn’t sound like a corporation. 152
The grammatical and syntactical counterarguments to this position are
not especially compelling. Initially, one could take the flat-footed position
that “individual” is used in a sense more akin to the common legal concept
of “person,” which includes both human beings and fictitious entities. One
can indeed find authority for this proposition, 153 but that authority seems
too slender in this context to overwhelm the specific, contextual argument
set forth above. Or one could parse the second clause so that the
prepositional phrase “of individuals” modifies “group” but not “union”:
i.e., the second clause would mean “any union although not a legal entity”
or “any group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”
There are problems with this position, though. First, maintaining it
requires—either explicitly or tacitly—one to rely on the “last antecedent
rule” (also known as reddendo singula singulis). 154 Under this rule, a
qualifying phrase should be read to modify only the noun that it
immediately follows. 155 Justice Scalia, in Barnhart v. Thomas, offers a
colorful illustration:
Consider, for example, the case of parents who, before leaving
their teenage son alone in the house for the weekend, warn him,
“You will be punished if you throw a party or engage in any other
activity that damages the house.” If the son nevertheless throws a
party and is caught, he should hardly be able to avoid punishment
by arguing that the house was not damaged. The parents
proscribed (1) a party, and (2) any other activity that damages the
house. As far as appears from what they said, their reasons for
prohibiting the home-alone party may have had nothing to do
with damage to the house—for instance, the risk that underage
drinking or sexual activity would occur. And even if their only
concern was to prevent damage, it does not follow from the fact
that the same interest underlay both the specific and the general
prohibition that proof of impairment of that interest is required
for both. The parents, foreseeing that assessment of whether an
activity had in fact “damaged” the house could be disputed by
152. Mohawk Transcript, supra note 116, at 29, 32.
153. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (9th ed. 2009) (“Person” includes both “[a]
human being” and “[a]n entity (such as a corporation) that is recognized by law as having
most of the rights and duties of a human being.”).
154. See SINGER, supra note 149, § 47:26 (providing a definition of the term and rules of
interpretation).
155. See Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, 651 F.3d 329, 335 (2d Cir. 2011)
(noting that under last antecedent rule, “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be
read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows” (quoting Barnhart v.
Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003)).
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their son, might have wished to preclude all argument by
specifying and categorically prohibiting the one activity—hosting
a party—that was most likely to cause damage and most likely to
occur. 156
But, as this example reveals, application of the rule is context sensitive
and easily gives place to evaluative arguments about intent and purpose. In
any event, the “rule” is much maligned, 157 is as often as not observed in the
breach, 158 and is opposed by the across-the-board rule, which holds that if a
modifying clause or phrase following a list is as applicable to the first word
as the others, then the modifier should apply to each item on the list. 159
Accordingly, most observers—including Justice Scalia—concede that the
rule is not really a “rule” in the absolute sense and that it “can assuredly be
overcome by other indicia of meaning . . . .” 160 Here, in contrast to Justice
Scalia’s example, we are dealing with two nouns, “union” and “group”
that—although not exactly synonymous—are semantically linked.
Specifically, a “union” is a combination of individuals whose confederation
is effected for “some common purpose”; 161 a “group,” in slight contrast, is a
number of individuals having “some unifying relationship.” 162 When we
reflect back on one of RICO’s undisputed purposes—viz., punishing the
infiltration of labor unions—the selection of “union” makes good sense.
But it is also logical that the drafters were trying to throw their net a bit
wider and punish the infiltration or corruption of other unincorporated
“groups” that might not have a specific “common purpose” yet might be
targets for infiltration because, like unions, they possess sufficient assets or
power to attract the attention of mobsters (e.g., Native American tribes,
fraternal organizations, political groups, governmental boards and agencies,
and sports clubs and leagues). 163

156. Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 27–28 (2003). For a discussion of the rule in
Supreme Court practice, see Jeremy L. Ross, A Rule of Last Resort: A History of the
Doctrine of the Last Antecedent in the United States Supreme Court, 39 SW. L. REV. 325
(2009).
157. See Terri LeClercq, Doctrine of the Last Antecedent: The Mystifying Morass of
Ambiguous Modifiers, 2 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 81, 89 (1996) (noting that the rule “has, in
its hundred-plus year history, created as much confusion and disagreement as the ambiguous
modifier its drafter [Sutherland] set out to clarify”).
158. See, e.g., Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 330–31 (1993) (discussing
the curing of a default on a secured claim).
159. SOLAN, supra note 43, at 34–36.
160. Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 26.
161. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 539 (1986).
162. Id. at 1290.
163. Lynch suggests that
[l]egal concepts like corporations or partnerships were inadequate to the
definitional task. Criminals could, and the studies available to Congress showed
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The point that should draw our closest attention, though, is that both
“union” and “group” signal categorization—i.e., they must be linguistically
coupled (either explicitly or implicitly) with the phrase “of something” and,
moreover, in plain meaning terms, that “of something” is usually denoted
as “of individuals.” As a further buttress, they appear in the statute as a
coordinate pair, which—as a matter of human language processing—leads
one naturally to interpret the phrase as modifying both disjuncts. 164 A
review of the opposing positions in Mohawk sharpens these general
propositions into an instrumental interpretive tool.
The plaintiff
acknowledged the ordinary dictionary meaning of “union” as we have just
discussed it, and then argued: “That concept is certainly broad enough to
encompass an association comprised of corporations and others,
particularly when read in context: ‘[A]ny union . . . associated in fact.’” 165
Plainly, this simply asserts that which is to be proven and also posits
phrasing that is at once awkward and redundant. At oral argument in
Mohawk, several of the Justices exposed the bareness of this position, as
this representative exchange reveals:
JUSTICE SCALIA: Either union means labor union or it
means a union or group of individuals.
MR. FOSTER: I would—Justice Scalia, I don’t believe that
union means labor union because—
JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay.
MR FOSTER: —if it meant a labor union there—

that they sometimes did, penetrate not only legal entities officially capable of
divided ownership, but also unincorporated businesses nominally owned by a
sole proprietor, acquiring covert interests in the profits of such businesses
through their muscle or capital. Indeed, “business” itself was too narrow a term.
What about labor unions, to take only the most obvious example? Or charitable
or social organizations? Or trade associations (the prototypical vehicle for the
operation of a “racket”)?
Lynch, supra note 3, at 688. If this is correct, then the appellate courts in Sutton and
Turkette were on to something in arguing that the rule of ejusdem generis limited the “union
or group of individuals” phrase to a legitimate—albeit not necessarily legally formed—
association. See, e.g., E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127, 129 (1961). In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference, an antitrust case, one of the
defendants was a group, apparently unincorporated, called the Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference, which—as the name suggests—was made up of railroad executives. Id. This is
more-or-less the point that Justice Stevens made in his Boyle dissent when he observed that
“[t]he juxtaposition of the two phrases suggests that ‘associated in fact’ just means
structured without the aid of legally defined structural forms such as the business
corporation.” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 953 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. Cf. SOLAN, supra note 43, at 32–34 (discussing the same proposition in the context
of conjuncts, i.e., coordinating pairs joined by “and”).
165. Brief for Respondents at 19, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 547 U.S. 516 (2006)
(No. 05-465), 2006 WL 282167, at *19 [hereinafter Mohawk Respondents’ Brief].
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JUSTICE SCALIA: I’ll give you that. Then—then it means
a union or group of individuals.
MR. FOSTER: A union or group of individuals.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Right. So, you know, you’re just as bad
off. 166
Finally, we must remember that it would have been an easy drafting
exercise to create the syntax that the Mohawk plaintiffs sought, either by
using the word “persons” in place of “individuals” or, at a minimum,
reordering the syntax to read, “group of individuals associated in fact or
union.” That Congress opted for neither option weighs in favor of
excluding corporations from the ambit of “associations in fact.”
ii.

Illustrative or Exhaustive

Although “enterprise” is included in RICO’s “definitions” section, the
“definition” does not does not lay out what conditions are necessary or
sufficient for something to qualify as an “enterprise.” 167 “Enterprise” thus
remains, as Solan calls it, a “fuzzy concept at the margins.” 168 This sets the
stage for an argument over the intended effect of § 1961(4): viz., is it
illustrative or exhaustive of the types of things that can qualify as an
enterprise? Those in the “illustrative” camp focus on the verb “includes”
that starts the section; in rebuttal, those in the “exhaustive” camp deny that
“includes” signals the presence of mere examples.
The conclusion that § 1961(4) is merely illustrative proceeds from
three related premises, one semantic, one structural, and one historicalcontextual. The semantic argument hinges on a putative distinction
between “includes” and “means” in any definitional statement. 169 Under

166. Mohawk Transcript, supra note 116, at 31.
167. Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L. J. 1561,
1589–90 (1994) [hereinafter Cunningham et al.].
168. SOLAN, supra note 43, at 107.
169. I say “putative” because, as we will see, the distinction is not a sharp one and
disagreements abound. And RICO cases maintaining that the situation is otherwise carry
more than a whiff of question-begging ipse dixit about them. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Am.
Ins. Co. v. Burgos, 867 F. Supp. 2d 216, 229 (D. P.R. 2011) (asserting that the definition of
enterprise “is merely illustrative as opposed to exhaustive . . . .”). Consider this oft-cited
gem from the Seventh Circuit:
The statute says “‘enterprise’ includes”—not “‘enterprise’ means.” The point of
the definition is to make clear that it need not be a formal enterprise; “associated
in fact” will do. Surely if three individuals can constitute a RICO enterprise, as
no one doubts, then the larger association that consists of them plus entities that
they control can be a RICO enterprise too. Otherwise while three criminal
gangs would each be a RICO enterprise, a loose-knit merger of the three, in
which each retained its separate identity, would not be, because it would not be
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this rubric, definitions that begin with “includes” sort into the “illustrative”
category; those that begin with “means” into the “exhaustive.” 170 This is
essentially a “plain meaning” argument that looks to dictionaries and
precedents for support. 171 But this leads nowhere other than to a battle of
dictionaries and precedents. 172 So at the end of this battle, we are left in a
state of suspense, certain only that “includes” “may sometimes be taken as
synonymous with ‘means,’” 173 and sometimes “connotes simply an
illustrative application of [a] general principle.” 174
With good arguments on both sides of the semantic coin, litigants next
turn to a variety of structural arguments that start with and then expand out
from § 1961(4). To combat the illustrativists, the exclusivists initially rely
on the interpretive maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 175 The
an association of individuals. That would make no sense.
United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 919
and 502 U.S. 823 (1991); see also Rowe v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., No. 09-CV-00491,
2010 WL 3699928, at *4 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2010) (discussing the statutory definition of
“long term care”). Sense or not, that is what the statute says, so something more than
assertion to the contrary should be required.
170. See Mohawk Respondents’ Brief, supra note 165, at 20–22 (citing Groman v.
Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82, 86 (1937) (“This conclusion is fortified by the fact that when
an exclusive definition is intended the word ‘means’ is employed . . . whereas here the word
used is ‘includes.’”), and Helvering v. Morgan’s, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 126 n.1 (1934) (“That
the draftsman used these words in a different sense seems clear. The natural distinction
would be that where ‘means’ is employed the term and its definition are to be
interchangeable equivalents, and that the verb ‘includes’ imports a general class, some of
whose particular instances are those specified in the definition.”)).
171. See Mohawk United States Amicus Brief, supra note 151, at 7 (quoting American
Surety Co. v. Marotta, 287 U.S. 513, 517 (1933) (“In [definitional] provisions of statutes
and other writings, ‘include’ is frequently, if not generally, used as a word of extension or
enlargement rather than as one of limitation or enumeration.”), and citing WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1143 (1993) (defining “include” to mean, inter alia, “to
place, list or rate as a part or component of a whole or of a larger group, class, or
aggregate”)).
172. See Mohawk Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 147, at 16–17 (quoting Willheim v.
Murchison, 342 F.2d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 1965) (Friendly, J.) (“Definitions in . . . legislation
often use the word ‘include’ out of abundant caution,” “that does not afford carte blanche to
‘include’ [additional items], neither expressly mentioned nor within the normal meaning of
the language, simply because a court may think this is a good idea.”), and citing AMERICAN
HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 701 (4th ed. 2002) (“include does not rule out the
possibility of a complete listing”)).
173. Helvering v. Morgan’s, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 125 (1934).
174. Fed. Land Bank v. Bismark Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 99–100 (1941).
175. In another variation that takes one to roughly the same interpretive place, some
have offered the maxim ejusdem generis (often thought of as “words of a feather flock
together”), which—when applied—suggests that “group of individuals” would be limited to
a group of individuals making up an enterprise that functions like the enumerated formal
ones. See United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 899 (1st Cir. 1980) (discussing the
principle of ejusdem generis).
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argument runs like this: “Had Congress intended to define ‘enterprise’ to
capture an association in fact with a corporation as a constituent member, it
could have easily done so.” 176 That is, it would have been a simple matter
to list “group” with no qualifying prepositional phrase or add “or entities”
to the existing prepositional phrase. But Congress did not, so the “sensible
inference [is] that the term left out must have been meant to be
excluded” 177—expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Additional weight to
this argument comes from the fact that “corporation” appears in the first
clause of the definition but not the second. 178 Ultimately, expressio unius
has persuasive force here, but it is not dispositive because it is a
counterweight to—not a negation of—the notion (discussed above) that a
sentence beginning with “includes” is exemplary, not comprehensive. 179
iii. Structural Issues
Another variation on the “means”/“includes” theme arises from the
overall structure of § 1961, which sets out ten separate definitions, five
beginning with “means,” 180 four with “includes” 181 and one with
“requires.” 182 Once again, there is something for everyone. An
illustrativist can be expected to note that, because Congress used both
“means” and “includes” in setting forth § 1961’s definitions, “means” must
signal a comprehensive definition and “includes” an exemplary one. 183 But
an exclusivist will quickly note that the three other instances in § 1961 in
which a definition begins with “includes” 184 are at least facially (and
176. Mohawk Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 147, at 14.
177. Chevron, U.S.A. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002).
178. City of Chi. v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994) (“‘[I]t is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely’ when it ‘includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another.’” (quoting Keene Corp. v. United
States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993))).
179. See Mohawk United States Amicus Brief, supra note 151, at 9–10 (“But while the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is often a useful aid to statutory construction, it
is not properly applied where, as here, Congress has used the verb ‘includes’ to introduce a
non-exhaustive list of examples.”).
180. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), (2), (6), (7), (8) (2006).
181. Id. at § 1961(3), (4), (9), (10).
182. Id. at § 1961(5).
183. Helvering v. Morgan’s, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 126 n.1 (1934) (“That the draftsman
used these words [viz.: means and includes] in a different sense seems clear.”); see also
Mohawk Respondents’ Brief, supra note 165, at 20–21 (discussing the distinction between
“includes” and “means”); Mohawk United States Amicus Brief, supra note 151, at 10
(discussing Congress’s selection of either “includes” or “means” to introduce provisions as a
signal).
184. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3), (9), (10) (defining “person,” “documentary material,” and
“Attorney General,” respectively).
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perhaps indisputably) comprehensive. 185 For example, § 1961(9) defines
“documentary material” to include “any book, paper, document, record,
recording, or other material.” That catch-all term, “other material”,
strongly suggests that the list is comprehensive; were it otherwise, the
catch-all would be superfluous. And indeed, at oral argument in Mohawk,
this argument found some traction as Justice Scalia noted that the United
States “did not refute the point that in other sections where it says includes,
it is unquestionable that it is exclusive.” 186
Expanding beyond § 1961 brings yet further elaborations on the
“means”/“includes” motif. First, § 1963(b), RICO’s criminal-forfeiture
provision, begins with “includes” and then goes on to identify real and
personal property, including illustrations of each. 187 In the first instance,
this definition would appear subject to the same sort of “means”/“includes”
analysis as § 1961(4), but the Supreme Court long ago held that identical
language in another federal statute 188 is an “all-inclusive listing.” 189 Once
again, although not putting the ultimate matter to rest, this undermines any
notion that there is a categorical distinction between definitions headlined
by “means” and those by “includes.” Second, § 1964(a) twice uses the
phrase “including, but not limited to” to underscore that a list is illustrative,

185. Mohawk Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 147, at 17–18; Mitchell et al., supra note
125, at 18 (“Three other provisions within section 1961 use ‘includes’ to begin their
definition, and each is unquestionably exhaustive.”).
186. Mohawk Transcript, supra note 116, at 48; see also Mohawk Transcript, supra note
116, at 42–43 (“JUSTICE ALITO: Why shouldn’t includes here be read to mean means
when that seems to be the way it’s used in other subsections of this provision and when the
only thing that seems to be—if this is not an exhaustive list, the only thing that seems
possibly to be omitted from the list is what’s involved here, which is a group consisting of a
corporation or other legal—other legal entity and—and natural persons.”) and 51
(“JUSTICE SOUTER: Do any of the court of appeals opinions deal specifically with the
peculiarity of this definition in which, although it starts out with the word includes, then
follows a—a listing, A, B, C, and D, and then it repeats one, but only one, of the items on
the list and says groups of these items, i.e., individuals, are included? That’s the peculiarity
of the definition. Do any of the courts of appeals come to grips with that?”).
187. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (2006) (“Property subject to criminal forfeiture under this
section includes—(1) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in
land; and (2) tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges,
interests, claims, and securities.”).
188. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(b) (2006) (presenting language identical to that in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(b)).
189. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607 (1989) (interpreting 21 U.S.C. §
853(b) (1982 ed., Supp. V)); see also Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3–4, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v.
Williams, 547 U.S. 516 (2006) (No. 05-465), 2007 WL 173804, at *3–4 [hereinafter
Mohawk Chamber of Commerce Amicus Brief] (discussing the statutory construction of §
1961(4)).
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not exhaustive. 190 The suggestion here is that if Congress had intended §
1961(4) to be similarly illustrative, it would have added the “but not limited
to” tag. 191 This argument is appealing, but its weight is only incremental,
given that at least some authorities hold that “including” and “including,
but not limited to” amount to the same thing. 192
iv.

A Dash of History

Most of the historical-contextual arguments will be reserved for a
subsequent section, but brief mention of a couple of drafting issues from
RICO’s history nicely fit as a cap to the linguistic arguments we have been
considering. The first of these arguments pins its hopes on the evolution of
multiple crime bills introduced by Senator John L. McClellan and Roman
L. Hruska beginning in 1965. 193 In short, this argument pivots on the fact
that the definitions sections of two predecessor bills, S. 1623 and S. 2187,
introduced their respective definitions with “means,” whereas S. 1861,
which for the first time defined “enterprise,” starts to use “means” and
“includes.” 194 The inference supposedly to be drawn is that Congress
progressed from a “limited” conception of “enterprise” to an “expansive”
one and expressed that movement by migrating from the one word to the
other. 195 This remains something more of an observation than a proof,
and—even for the litigant that sponsored it—it was mostly relegated to a
footnote. 196 And, even more important, it does not avoid the central
problem: viz., that Congress does not use—and courts do not interpret—the
two words in a way consistently signaling a bright-line contradistinction.
The second argument arises from the Senate and House Reports
accompanying RICO, which both state that “enterprise” is defined “to
include associations in fact, as well as legally recognized associative
entities. 197 Thus, infiltration of any associative group by any individual or

190. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2006).
191. Mohawk Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 147, at 17.
192. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 831 (9th ed. 2009) (“The participle including typically
indicates a partial list . . . . But some drafters use phrases such as including without
limitation and including but not limited to—which mean the same thing.”).
193. Mohawk Respondents’ Brief, supra note 165, at 21–22 n.73.
194. Id. at 22 n.73 (citing G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy, Reflections on Reves v.
Ernst & Young: Its Meaning and Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and
Conspiracy Liability Under RICO, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1345, 1666–68 (1996)). It is
perhaps worth noting that the bill history that Blakey and Roddy sketch is more convoluted
than the Mohawk Respondent suggests.
195. Id. at 22 n.74 (citing United States v. Russello, 464 U.S. 16, 22–23 (1983)).
196. Id.
197. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 4032 (1970); S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 159 (1969).
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group capable of holding a property interest can be reached.” 198 Here, the
focus is on the “any associative group” phrase, which is read to support an
expansive interpretation of “union or group of individuals associated in
fact” that would include corporations. 199 But this would appear to prove at
once too much and too little: too much because no one disputes that any
“associative group” of the statutorily enumerated sort can be an
enterprise; 200 too little because the phrase “associative group” phrase—in
context—refers to legitimate associations (like a trade or labor union) that
can be “infiltrate[ed],” and what is really at issue in cases like Mohawk is
an allegedly illegitimate enterprise in which a corporation is a constituent
part. 201
B. Systemic Arguments
RICO’s many vagaries provide almost endless possibilities for
devising systemic interpretive arguments based on policy, principles,
history and the like. A few representative examples will aid our discussion.
1. Contextual Harmonization
“The argument from contextual harmonization looks to the way in
which any statutory provision is to be found nested in a larger legal
scheme, at least that of the single whole statute, often that of a set of related
statutes.” 202 The aim of this technique is to find the proper interpretation of
a troublesome statutory provision by searching other statutory provisions
that cast light back on the target. We have already seen a narrow
application of the technique when we looked at RICO provisions other than
the second clause of § 1961(4) to aid in interpreting that second clause. 203
But the net can be thrown still wider. For example, if we revert to the
question of whether “individual” means only a single, natural person, one
can look to the general definition provisions of Title 18 (of which RICO is
a part). There, one finds that “[a]s used in this title, the term ‘organization’

198. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 4032; S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 159.
199. Mohawk United States Amicus Brief, supra note 151, at 12.
200. A fair reading is that the phrase “associative group” was coined and employed as a
shorthand for the longer formulation in the immediately preceding sentence: viz.,
“associations in fact, as well as legally recognized associative entities.”
201. The overreading of “any” is unmasked on the very next page of the Senate Report,
which states that “Section 1962 establishes a threefold prohibition aimed at the infiltration
of legitimate organizations.” S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 159.
202. MACCORMICK, supra note 126, at 128.
203. See supra Part IV.A.2.c. (explaining the structural issues in interpreting the act
using other RICO provisions).
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means a person other than an individual.” 204 By defining the term
“organization” by what it is not, the implication is that Congress
established a property non-identity under which the reverse must also be
true: i.e., an “individual” cannot be an “organization.”
2. Precedential Argument
“The argument from precedent says that if a statutory provision has
previously been subjected to judicial interpretation, it ought to be
interpreted in conformity with the interpretation given to it by other
courts.” 205 Although a few district court decisions have held that a
corporation may not be part of an association in fact, 206 the circuit courts
that have opined on the issue all agree that it can. 207 As the Third Circuit
recently and emphatically put it, “every circuit to consider the question
has . . . held that corporations may be part of an association-in-fact
enterprise[,]” and “[t]he judges of these circuits are equally unanimous, for
not one has dissented from the proposition that an association-in-fact
enterprise may include corporations.” 208 This may be the most powerful
argument in favor of leaving the interpretation of § 1961(4) as it stands.
This is to say that however vague or ambiguous the text of the definition
may have been ab initio, thirty years of precedent have put the world on
notice that corporations can form parts of associations in fact, which takes
the starch out of arguments based on fairness or lack of notice. This is not

204. 18 U.S.C. § 18 (2006); see also Mohawk Chamber of Commerce Amicus Brief,
supra note 189, at 8 (arguing that RICO’s provisions distinguish between individuals and
corporations).
205. MACCORMICK, supra note 126, at 128.
206. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Boeing Co., 357 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1364–65 (M.D.
Fla. 2005) (holding that a corporation may not be considered part of an association in fact
for RICO purposes); Benard v. Hoff, 727 F. Supp. 211, 215 (D. Md. 1989)(holding the
same); Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1146, 1151
(D.N.J. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding the same).
207. See, e.g., Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 548 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 464 (2007)(including corporations within the definition of
association in fact for RICO purposes); United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 484–85 (4th
Cir. 2002)(holding the same); United States v. London, 66 F.3d 1227, 1243–44 (1st Cir.
1995) (holding the same); Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 995 n.7 (8th
Cir. 1989)(holding the same); United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 353 (D.C. Cir.
1988)(holding the same); United States v. Navarro-Ordas, 770 F.2d 959, 969 n.19 (11th Cir.
1985)(holding the same); United States v. Aimone, 715 F.2d 822, 828 (3d Cir.
1983)(holding the same); Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Bus. Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272,
1285 (7th Cir. 1983)(holding the same); Atlas United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 625–
26 (5th Cir. 1980)(holding the same); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393–94 (2d Cir.
1979)(holding the same).
208. United States v. Phillip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1111–12 (2009).
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to say that the Supreme Court cannot or should not step in to correct a
wholesale misinterpretation of the statute, but it does make the task more
difficult for litigants. 209 On the other hand, though, most of the circuit
decisions have simply assumed, “largely without discussion,” that a
corporation can be part of an association in fact. 210 This surely means that
attorneys — consistent with their Rule 11 obligations — have a good faith
basis for raising and preserving this issue for appellate review and an
ultimate petition for writ of certiorari. 211
3. Analogical Argument
Statutes do not exist in a vacuum, and so where one is faced with
interpreting a statute that is significantly analogous to another, it makes
good sense to interpret the one in harmony with the other. 212 On the
“means”/“includes” point, for example, the United States argued in
Mohawk that the rule at issue in United States v. New York Telephone 213
offered a “very similar” analogy. 214 In that case, the Supreme Court
examined a rule of criminal procedure providing that “[t]he term ‘property’
is used in this rule to include documents, books, papers and any other
tangible objects.” 215 In assessing the scope of the rule, the Court noted that
other definitions in it were “introduced by the phrase ‘to mean,’” and
concluded that the rule “does not restrict or purport to exhaustively
enumerate all the items” within its ambit. 216 Thus, despite the list of
physical objects, the Court held that the rule was broad enough to
comprehend “intangible items such as dial impulses recorded by pen
registers as well as tangible items.” 217 By analogy, then, the United States
in Mohawk argued that the Court could read “individuals” to include
“corporations” just as it had previously read “tangible” to include
“intangible.” 218
209. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (showing that absent a circuit split, the only avenue for review
would be Rule 10(c), which states that “a United States court of appeals has decided an
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court.”).
210. SMITH & REED, supra note 41, ¶ 3.05; see also Mitchell et al., supra note 125, at 9,
31 n.138 (noting, among other things, that “[f]ive circuits rely exclusively on the analysis
from other circuits’ opinions”).
211. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (requiring that all pleadings before the Court be proper, with
reasonable basis in fact and law, and not be presented for an improper purpose).
212. MACCORMICK, supra note 126, at 129.
213. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 169 (1977).
214. Mohawk United States Amicus Brief, supra note 151, at 11.
215. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 184 n.12.
216. Id. at 169 & n.15.
217. Id. at 170.
218. Mohawk United States Amicus Brief, supra note 151, at 11.
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The problem here is that the analogy is not especially close. It is one
thing to argue that § 1964(c) of the RICO Act should be interpreted by
analogy to § 4 of the Clayton Act because the former was derived from the
latter and their wording is almost the same. 219 It is quite another thing,
though, to argue that a defunct rule of criminal procedure can shed much
interpretive light on a RICO provision dealing with a wholly different
concept. But there is another problem afoot: viz., that an argument by
analogy works best where the number of candidates to consider is
reasonably small and the context is reasonably specific. For example, New
York Telephone’s interpretation of what the word “property” “includes” in
a rule of criminal procedure might have some bearing on the interpretation
of what RICO’s definition of “property” “includes” in § 1963(b), given that
both the rule and the statute set out to define property that the Government
can “seize.” 220 Here, of course, we are dealing with the interpretation of
what the word “enterprise” “includes,” so there is a glaring mismatch in
terminology that devalues the usefulness of analogical reasoning on the
point. Moreover, as we have already seen, “includes” appears hundreds of
times in statutory definitions and has been interpreted again and again to
differing—sometimes flatly contradictory—effect. In sum, rough analogies
abound with respect to what the presence of “includes” at the head of a
definition is intended to signal, but they are so rough and multifarious as to
be mostly pointless and certainly not conclusive.
4. Conceptual Argument
A conceptual argument, which gains its validity by appealing to the
desire for coherence across a whole system, “says that if any recognized
and doctrinally elaborated general legal concept is used in the formulation
of a statutory provision, it ought to be interpreted so as to maintain a
consistent use of the concept throughout the system as a whole.” 221 Once
again, “individual” provides a telling example. There is good evidence that
Congress typically (though not exclusively) uses “individual” to refer to a
“natural person” as opposed to a “corporation” or other fictional legal

219. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (applying Clayton
Act § 4 proximate cause requirement to § 1964(c)); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff
& Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 152 (1987) (applying Clayton Act § 4 statute of limitations to
§ 1964(c)).
220. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a)(2)(A) (former FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(h)) (defining
property to include specific items as well as any tangible items or information) with 18
U.S.C. § 1963(b) (2006) (defining property to include various sorts of real and personal
property).
221. MACCORMICK, supra note 126, at 130.

GORDON_FINAL (ARTICLE 1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

OF GANGS AND GAGGLES

8/28/2014 2:24 PM

1015

entity. 222 Quite often, the distinction becomes apparent in statutory
definitions of “person,” which separately list “individuals,” “corporations,”
and a host of other entities. 223 One commentator has identified 180
different federal statutes that are designed this way, which strongly
suggests that individual-means-single-human-being is a concept recognized
across the system. 224
In some cases, a conceptual argument is a broader application of
theory behind arguments from contextual harmonization. In other words,
one can range further afield from a word or phase as it is nestled in a statute
or set of related statutes. For example, part of the United States Internal
Revenue Code contains several pages of definitions. 225 The definitions are
introduced by, among other things, “means,” “includes,” “means and
includes,” and “includes only.” 226 This suggests above all that Congress
does not have a simple, binary method for introducing definitions in a way
that tacitly labels the lists that follow as bounded or unbounded. And the
problem with “includes” is so acute that it has its own definition within the
tax code: “[t]he terms ‘includes’ and ‘including’ when used in a definition
contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise
within the meaning of the term defined.” 227 Plainly, if “includes” were to
always indicate the presence of an unbounded list, no such statement would
be necessary. This is, in essence, a negative conceptual argument—i.e.,
222. See Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012)(confining the definition
of individual to include only natural persons). In Mohamad, the Supreme Court held that
the term “individual” as used in the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA)
encompassed only natural persons. Id. at 1705. The Court first noted that “‘individual’
ordinarily means ‘[a] human being, a person,’” id. at 1707 (quoting 7 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 880 (2d ed. 1989)), and looked to the Dictionary Act for support. Id. (citing 1
U.S.C. § 1 (2006)). The Court also noted that “federal statutes routinely distinguish
between an ‘individual’ and an organizational entity of some kind,” and that before the
Court would assume Congress intended “individual” to include more than natural persons,
“there must be some indication Congress intended such a result.” Id. (emphasis added). To
the Court, this indication could come from “the rare statute . . . in which Congress expressly
defines ‘individual’ to include corporate entities,” or when “the statutory context makes that
intention clear, because any other reading of ‘individual’ would lead to an ‘absurd’ result.”
Id. The TVPA, however, gave no such indications. See also Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621
F.3d 1116, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that through the Dictionary Act, “Congress has
directed courts to presume the word ‘individual’ in a statute refers to natural persons and not
corporations”).
223. The Dictionary Act, which sets the default definitions for the United States Code,
takes this tack. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress,
unless the context indicates otherwise . . . ‘person’ include[s] corporations . . . as well as
individuals.”).
224. Mitchell et al., supra note 125, at 13 n.60.
225. 26 U.S.C. § 7701 (2006).
226. Id.
227. Id. § 7701(c).
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there is no single concept associated with the word “includes” across the
legal system as it is embodied in the United States Code.
5. General Principles Argument
General principles argue that, if there are general principles of law
relevant to the target statute, the statute should be interpreted in the way
that is most congruent with those principles. 228 An uncodified portion of
RICO directs that it “shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes.” 229 This liberal-construction clause has led some courts to
conclude that “the term ‘enterprise’ should be construed broadly to include
an association of legal entities.” 230 But there is a countervailing
constitutional principle in play: the rule of lenity, which “ensures fair
warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only
to conduct clearly covered.” 231 As a canon of construction, the rule finds
voice in the notion that criminal statutes must be strictly construed. 232
Thus, if § 1961(4) were determined to be ambiguous, the rule of lenity
would demand a narrow reading of the term “enterprise”: “RICO, since it
has criminal applications as well, must, even in its civil applications,
possess the degree of certainty required for criminal laws.” 233 So there is a
good argument that a departure from a literal reading of §1961(4) by
expansively reading “includes” is, as Justice Scalia suggested in Mohawk,
“at least ambiguous,” which would trigger application of the rule of
lenity. 234 As a counter, one could expect arguments that the statute is not
ambiguous, 235 any ambiguity is not sufficiently “grievous,” 236 and that any
228. MACCORMICK, supra note 126, at 130.
229. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922,
947.
230. United States v. Blinder, 10 F.3d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Mitchell et
al., supra note 125, at 7 (noting how the term “enterprise” should be construed in the
context of RICO).
231. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997). See also Mohawk Petitioner’s
Brief, supra note 147, at 19–20 (discussing what would trigger the application of the rule of
lenity); SOLAN, supra note 43, at 77–81 (discussing how the Supreme Court interpreted the
term “enterprise” in the context of RICO); Mitchell et al., supra note 125, at 19–20
(discussing and defining the rule of lenity).
232. Lanier, 520 U.S. at 266.
233. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 257 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
234. Mohawk Transcript, supra note 116, at 47.
235. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587-588 n.10 (1981) (“There being no
ambiguity in the RICO provisions at issue here [viz., §1961(4)], the rule of lenity does not
come into play.”); Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 950 (2009) (“Because the statutory
language is clear, there is no need to reach . . . arguments based on statutory purpose,
legislative history, or the rule of lenity.”).
236. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991).
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unfair surprise attendant upon ambiguity has been cured by the unbroken
line of circuit opinions holding that corporations can indeed be members of
associations in fact. 237 The first objection is, of course, a significant hurdle,
given the Supreme Court’s repeated insistence that particular sections of
RICO are “clear” or “plain,” even though the Justices vehemently disagree
as to what that clear or plain meaning is. 238 We will defer for now the
question of why that might be and simply register that courts often take a
“plain meaning” approach to RICO provisions that are anything but plain.
6. Historical Argument
“The argument from history takes note that a statute or group of
statutes can over time come to be interpreted in accordance with a
historically evolved understanding of the point and purpose of the statute,
or of the group of statutes taken together as a whole.” 239 One way to think
about this type of argument vis-à-vis § 1961(4) is to consider the
substantial precedent holding that an association-in-fact enterprise can
include corporations. We have already examined that point and there is no
need to labor it further. Another way is to think about the purpose of RICO
and how well particular interpretations of the “enterprise” definition fit
with that purpose. We will take up these ideas more fully in the next
section, but it is worth pausing for a moment to reflect back on our
discussion of Turkette and its holding that statutorily covered enterprises
can be illegitimate as well as legitimate, and how that decision impacts the
interpretive issue before us.
The ultimate point we must keep in mind is that the Supreme Court
made a policy decision in Turkette, confirmed in Boyle, to read § 1961(4)
broadly so as to make more criminals subject to RICO’s proscriptions and
penalties. But this decision came at an associated cost: subsequent courts
237. See Mohawk United States Amicus Brief, supra note 151, at 15–16 & n.6 (noting
that even if a term is singular, there is precedent for the term being interpreted to extend to
group entities).
238. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479 (finding section 1964 (c)
clear, but divided on the plain meaning of the text). In Sedima, all nine Justices agreed that
§ 1964(c) was unambiguous, but split 5-4 as to the provision’s plain meaning. See id. at
495–97 (holding that the plain language of § 1964(c) forecloses an “amorphous
‘racketeering injury’ requirement”); id. at 509–10 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that
the majority’s rejection of a “racketeering injury” requirement “distorts the statutory
language under the guise of adopting a plain-meaning definition, and it does so without
offering any indication of congressional intent that justifies a deviation from . . . the plain
meaning of the statute”); see also SOLAN, supra note 43, at 101 (noting that “in an
interesting voting paradox, the justices agreed 9-0 that the language is plain, but disagreed
5-4 about what it means”).
239. MACCORMICK, supra note 126, at 130.
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and litigants must interpret the section in light of Turkette, which is to say
in light of history. 240 That history includes the oft-repeated statement that
the “enterprise” concept is unbounded (i.e., “[t]here is no restriction upon
the associations embraced by the definition”). 241 This statement can be
wrenched out of context and, without its trailing qualifiers, appear as a
license to reach anything, including associations in fact of corporations. 242
These consequences demand closer examination, a subject to which we
now turn.
C. Teleological-Evaluative Arguments: Consequentialism by Another
Name
Examining the language and context of a statute are important tools in
interpretation, but, as MacCormick reminds us, “other values can be
significant.” 243 Some of these values begin to emerge from the background
when we consider that statutes are not found in a cabbage patch or
delivered by a stork: they are the product of the purposive acts of
legislators. These acts are taken “with a view to reforming the law”—to
correcting what MacCormick calls a “mischief” in the existing body of
law. 244 Thus, an interpretation that would achieve the ends at which a
statute is aimed (be it curing a defect, closing a loophole, or reforming an
inequity) has much to commend it. One way of thinking about this is, as
Lon Fuller once suggested, by analogy to an invention that was left as a

240. Solan suggests that courts have interpreted RICO under a “law enforcement
model,” by which he means that courts “have been generous with prosecutors and stingy
with civil plaintiffs in interpreting various provisions of the statute.” Lawrence M. Solan,
Statutory Inflation and Institutional Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2209, 2255 (2003).
This phenomenon was no doubt exacerbated by the fact that the interpretations of RICO’s
substantive provisions first occurred in criminal cases, where the courts were inclined to
give the Government a fair amount of leeway in its fight against crime. And, as Reed notes,
[t]he happenstance that civil RICO was not “discovered” by the plaintiff’s bar
until the 1980’s has had an important influence on the development of RICO
jurisprudence. Had the much deplored explosion of civil RICO litigation
occurred ten years earlier, the courts would have interpreted the statute much
more restrictively than they did with only criminal RICO prosecutions on their
docket.
SMITH & REED, supra note 41, ¶ 3.02[1] & n.19 (noting also that “[o]nly a handful of civil
RICO cases were brought between 1970 and 1980”).
241. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580–81 (1981); see discussion supra Part
II.A (giving the facts of the Turkette case and noting that the Supreme Court read RICO
broadly to include criminal activity).
242. See, e.g., United States v. Phillip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1112 (2009)
(demonstrating author’s point that RICO can be taken out of context if read too liberally).
243. MACCORMICK, supra note 126, at 132.
244. Id.
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pencil sketch at the time that its author died. 245 Someone continuing that
work would have to ask what the projected device was supposed to do and
discern the motivating principle behind it. According to Fuller,
[s]o it is usually with difficult problems of interpretation. If the
draftsman of a statute were called into direct consultation, he
would normally have to proceed in the same manner as the judge
by asking such questions as the following: Does this case fall
within the mischief which the statute sought to remedy? Does it
fall within the “true reason of the remedy” appointed by the
statute, that is, is the prescribed remedy apt for dealing with this
particular manifestation of the general mischief at which the
statute was aimed? 246
Such is the case with RICO and the OCCA of which it is part:
“Congress decided that organized crime posed such a grave threat to
society that only new, more stringent legislation could ameliorate the
situation,” especially given that under then-existing laws “most organized
crime participants went unpunished.” 247
“The problem was
248
multifaceted,” as was the solution, and it behooves latter-day interpreters
to (re)consider what defects Congress sought to cure through the OCCA
and how it went about doing so.
As I noted at the outset, one of the keys to understanding RICO is to
understand the evils it sought to redress. One popular, simple, and oftquoted formulation comes from a piece written over twenty years ago by
(now) Justice Alito, who opined that “RICO’s criminal prohibitions have
two aims[:]
to stop organized crime’s infiltration of legitimate
business[;] . . . [and] to make it unlawful for individuals to function as
members of organized criminal groups.” 249 But is this really so? Was this
RICO’s purpose? Or was that the purpose of the entire OCCA? We will
not find an absolutely clear answer in the structure of RICO or the OCCA,
and none of the case law or scholarship puts the matter to rest in anything
close to a definitive way. But asking the question and looking at the
available evidence can help us answer the important subsidiary question:
can a corporation be part of an association-in-fact enterprise?
Many previous commentators and courts have recounted the
legislative history of RICO in copious detail, so I will resist the temptation
here and stick to a limited number of legislative facts that are largely

245. LON. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 84–88 (Yale Univ. Press rev. ed. 1969).
246. Id. at 85.
247. United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 899–900 (1st Cir. 1980).
248. Id. at 900.
249. Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Racketeering Made Simple(r), in THE RICO RACKET 1, 3–4
(Gary L. McDowell ed., 1989).
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undisputed but that are nonetheless sufficiently illuminating for our
purposes. 250 To do this, we must set our initial vantage point at a distance
and look at the OCCA and—to put the analysis in MacCormick’s
framework—ask a series of questions that will help us identify the social
problem that the OCCA was intended to remedy and, even more
specifically, what “defect” in existing law required redress in the form of a
new law.
First, what was the social problem? As President Nixon put it to
Congress, “[O]rganized crime has deeply penetrated broad segments of
American life. In our great cities, it is operating prosperous criminal
cartels. In our suburban areas and smaller cities, it is expanding its
corrosive influence.” 251 How does it do this? It has a “virtual monopoly of
illegal gambling, the numbers racket, and the importation of narcotics,” the
proceeds of which give it the power and resources to underwrite criminal
businesses like loansharking, to “infiltrate and corrupt organized labor,”
and to increase “its enormous holdings and influence in the world of
legitimate business.” 252 Is this a new problem? Yes, because although
organized crime is as old as the Republic, “it has only been in this last half
century that these criminal groups have begun seriously to threaten the very
integrity of our Nation and the well-being of such large segments of our
people.” 253 How did this happen? Although “organized criminal groups,”
the most influential of which were “the 26 families of La Cosa Nostra,” had
been subject to prosecution efforts, “none had been destroyed” and the
leaders of these groups had “been notoriously successful in ‘getting off’
even in those relatively few cases in which the evidence has warranted the
prosecution.” 254 Why was this so and how could it be fixed? Mafia
chieftains “have developed the process of ‘insulation’ to a remarkable
degree,” so much so that even when law enforcement is generally aware of
250. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 510–19 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587–93 (1981) (exploring
the legislative history of RICO, reaching a broad interpretation); SMITH & REED, supra note
41, ¶ 1.01 (providing background on how courts have interpreted RICO and reached their
conclusions); Califa, supra note 12, at 807–14 (exploring RICO’s application to criminal
defendants); G. Robert Blakey, The Rico Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on
Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 249–79 (1982) (providing a background of
the legislative history of RICO, including the ideas behind the origins of RICO, and how
RICO interacts with the OCCA.); G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts—Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53
TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1014–21 (1980) (detailing the legislative history of RICO); Lynch, supra
note 3, at 666–80 (noting the intent of the legislature in passing RICO and RICO’s history).
251. S. DOC. NO. 91-617 (1969) (quoting H.R. DOC. NO. 91-105, at 1–3 (1969)).
252. Id.
253. 116 CONG. REC. 585 (1970).
254. Id. at 585–86.

GORDON_FINAL (ARTICLE 1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

OF GANGS AND GAGGLES

8/28/2014 2:24 PM

1021

a leader’s involvement in criminal activity, convicting him of his crimes “is
usually extremely difficult and sometimes is impossible” simply because
there is no evidence linking him “with the crime or his hireling who
commits it.” 255 The antidote to this was
a bill which has been carefully drafted to cure a number of
debilitating defects in the evidence-gathering process in
organized crime investigations, to circumscribe defense abuse of
pretrial proceedings, to broaden Federal jurisdiction over
syndicated gambling and its corruption where interstate
commerce is affected, to attack and to mitigate the effects of
racketeer infiltration of legitimate organizations affecting
interstate commerce, and to make possible extended terms of
incarceration for the dangerous offenders who prey on our
society. 256
It is against this backdrop that we must consider the question of
RICO’s concerns and purposes and whether those concerns and purposes
extend to congeries of legitimate corporations accused (most often, as we
have seen) of uniting for the purpose of executing some sort of fraudulent
marketing scheme.
To recap, the OCCA was intended to cure “defects” in existing law
that had allowed Mafia leaders to escape prosecution because of, for
example, witness tampering and intimidation and to plug holes that had
made it difficult to prosecute interstate gambling operations or to prohibit
the infiltration or corruption of legitimate organizations. 257 So where does
RICO figure into this picture? A good place to start is with the other titles
of the OCCA to see what they do. Eight of the titles deal with special
problems associated with prosecuting members of organized crime: Title I
allows the creation of special grand juries and preserving confidentiality; 258
Title II provides for enhanced witness immunity; 259 Title III deals with
recalcitrant and fleeing witnesses; 260 Title IV treats false declarations; 261
Title V provides for the security of witnesses and their families; 262 Title VI
expands the use of pretrial depositions; 263 Title VII creates new procedures

255. Id. at 586.
256. Id. at 585.
257. See id. (discussing various issues related to organized crime and the inability to
effectively prosecute such individuals responsible but insulated from liability).
258. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923
(1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3321) (2006)).
259. Id. at 926–32 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 5001 (2006)).
260. Id. at 932 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821–1825 (2006)).
261. Id. at 932–33 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621–1622 (2006)).
262. Id. § 501, 84 Stat. at 933.
263. Id. at 934 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3503 (2006)).
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for dealing with evidence obtained from electronic surveillance; 264 and
Title X provides for extended prison terms for dangerous special
offenders. 265 One title, Title VIII, essentially federalizes criminal law
pertaining to illegal gambling. 266 Another, Title XII, creates a commission
charged with evaluating the effectiveness and constitutionality of federal
criminal laws and practices. 267 That leaves Title XI, which deals with
explosives and appears to be a late—and not especially germane—addon, 268 and Title IX, RICO. 269
From this structure, it is easy to see that two of the three substantive
groups deal with two of the major objects of concern repeatedly articulated
in crime-commission and legislative-committee crime reports from the
mid-to-late 1960s: prosecution difficulties and illegal gambling. So what
was RICO supposed to do? We know that Title IX was—as of January 21,
1970—entitled “Corrupt Organizations” and described thusly: “Prohibits
infiltration of legitimate organizations by racketeers or proceeds of
racketeering activities where interstate commerce is affected. Authorizes
civil remedies comparable to anti-trust to prevent violation of law by
divestiture dissolution or reorganization.” 270 The House and Senate
Reports, as well as the Report of Senate Judiciary Committee, are all to
similar effect—i.e., RICO was aimed at infiltration of legitimate
organizations: “Section 1962 establishes a threefold prohibition aimed at
stopping the infiltration of racketeers into legitimate organizations.” 271
Title IX “has as its purpose the elimination of the infiltration of organized
crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate
commerce.” Three specific evils are identified: “subversion of legitimate
organizations,” “infiltration of legitimate businesses,” and “takeover of
legitimate unions.” 272 And when asked for their views on S. 1961, RICO’s
direct predecessor bill, individuals responding on behalf of executivebranch agencies—including the Attorney General, the Treasury
Department, and the Small Business Administration—appeared to think
that they were commenting on “a bill designed to prohibit the infiltration of
legitimate organizations by racketeers.” 273

264. Id. at 935-36 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (2006)).
265. Id. at 948 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575–3578 (2006)).
266. Id. at 936–40 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2006)).
267. Id. § 1201, 84 Stat. at 960.
268. Id. at 952 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 841–848 (2006)).
269. Id. at 941 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§1961–1968 (2006)).
270. S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 591 (1969).
271. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 57 (1970).
272. S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 76 (1969).
273. S. REP. NO. 91-617 at 121-26 (Office of Deputy Attorney General); Id. at 126
(General Counsel of the Treasury) (“to prohibit the infiltration or management of legitimate

GORDON_FINAL (ARTICLE 1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

OF GANGS AND GAGGLES

8/28/2014 2:24 PM

1023

Read in this light, RICO’s purpose is narrower than one might assume.
To be sure, it was not crafted solely to cripple the group that “is directly
descended from and is patterned upon the centuries-old Sicilian terrorist
society, the Mafia” (although that was certainly the impetus and primary
target). 274 In other words, the statute would reach any organized criminals
(be they other ethnic groups, bikers, or otherwise) that infiltrated and
corrupted legitimate businesses. 275 But the relatively narrow scope of
RICO within the larger OCCA was believed to carry a powerful wallop:
viz., the new remedies. If we recall our earlier discussion, prosecution
efforts had been spotty, and—even though some notorious racketeers had
been imprisoned—”[n]ot a single one of the ‘families’ of La Cosa Nostra

organizations by racketeering activity or the proceeds of racketeering activity, where
interstate or foreign commerce is affected, and for other purposes”); Id. at 128 (Small
Business Administration, Office of the Administrator) (“to combat the infiltration of
legitimate business by organized crime”).
274. 116 CONG. REC. 503, 586 (1970).
275. Although the idea was abandoned on Constitutional grounds, there was discussion
in the House about creating a status offense based on membership in the Mafia. See Bennett
v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063 (1982) (discussing legislative history and congressional
intent). Justice Thomas, in his Anza dissent emphasizes the importance that Congress put on
the illegitimate competitive advantage that racketeers had over their legitimate rivals:
The sponsor of a Senate precursor to RICO noted that “‘the evil to be curbed is
the unfair competitive advantage inherent in the large amount of illicit income
available to organized crime.’” Upon adding a provision for a civil remedy in a
subsequently proposed bill, Senator Hruska noted: “‘[This] bill also creates civil
remedies for the honest businessman who has been damaged by unfair
competition from the racketeer businessman. Despite the willingness of the
courts to apply the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to organized crime activities, as a
practical matter the legitimate businessman does not have adequate civil
remedies available under that act. This bill fills that gap.’” A portion of these
bills was ultimately included in RICO, which was attached as Title IX to the
Organized Crime Control Act. The Committee Report noted that the Title “has
as its purpose the elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and
racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce.”
The observations of the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, the source of much of the congressional concern over
organized crime, are consistent with these statements. Its chapter on Organized
Crime noted that “organized crime is also extensively and deeply involved in
legitimate business . . . . [I]t employs illegitimate methods—monopolization,
terrorism, extortion, tax evasion—to drive out or control lawful ownership and
leadership and to exact illegal profits from the public.” The report noted that
“[t]he millions of dollars [organized crime] can throw into the legitimate
economic system gives it power to manipulate the price of shares on the stock
market, to raise or lower the price of retail merchandise, to determine whether
entire industries are union or nonunion, to make it easier or harder for
businessmen to continue in business.”
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 471–74 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(internal citations omitted).
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has been destroyed.” 276 RICO was designed not just to eject organized
crime from legitimate organizations but through, among other things,
onerous forfeiture provisions, “remove the leaders of organized crime from
their sources of economic power.” 277 “Instead of their positions being filled
by successors no different in kind, the channels of commerce can be freed
of racketeering influence.” 278
All this suggests that Turkette and Boyle were wrongly decided, but
the holdings of those cases are not our object of study. But it brings us to
the doors of three related inquiries that will help us round out the
teleological argument: (1) the relationship between the words of the statute
and their purpose and intent, (2) RICO’s importance as a potent weapon the
in the Government’s prosecutorial arsenal, and (3) whether a common, lay
understanding of what an “enterprise” is can aid the understanding of the
ends of RICO and the consequences of interpreting it one way or the other.
When thinking about legislative intent and statutory purpose, it is
worth noting that this nomenclature is sometimes disputed and often
conflated. 279 If one were to draw a line between the two terms, “intent”
might be a rather narrow concept (the “idea she sought to transfer using the
words she chose to speak”), whereas “purpose” would be broader (“what a
legislator imagines or hopes will change about the world by means of
enacting the legislation”). 280 On this view, the intent of RICO might be
framed as “sending individuals to jail who invest in, muscle in on, or
operate enterprises through specified racketeering acts.” The purpose of
RICO, by contrast, might be framed more broadly, perhaps something like
“helping destroy organized crime in the United States.” 281 Now there is a
good argument to be made that Congress is too complex as a social group
to have “purposes” in the strong sense, even though it can have identifiable
“intents.” 282 But this issue need not long detain us because for our
276. S. REP. NO. 91-617 at 45 (1969).
277. Id. at 80.
278. Id.
279. For a helpful survey of the various positions, see Abby Wright, For All Intents and
Purposes: What Collective Intention Tells Us about Congress and Statutory Interpretation,
154 U. PA. L. REV 984 (2006) [hereinafter Wright].
280. See id. at 991–92 (discussing a distinction between intent and purpose).
281. Plainly, undertaking this exercise will not generate single definitive formulations of
intents and purposes.
282. See Wright, supra note 279, at 1007–24. The gist of Wright’s argument is that
Congressional intent can be divined with respect to particular legislation because of how
Congress is structured and the procedures it follows. This is so even though we know that
individual legislators may not have carefully considered a bill, might be hostile to it, and
may have voted for it for horsetrading reasons. But inferring purpose in the broadest sense
requires resort to extrinsic reasons, which renders any conclusions suspect. Even though
Wright believes that Congress is not an entity capable of forming purposes, she ultimately
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purposes we need not defend the farthest outpost: we will look at intent and
purpose—however defined—as what Congress hoped to accomplish. 283
For MacCormick, the “value-based and teleological character” of
statutes forces an interpreter to consider what values and aims “should be
postulated as the telos or end imputed to legislation.” 284 And in effecting
this inquiry, “the legislature’s intention is the proper guide to the
imputation of values as ends of legislation[,]” which we would be wise to
remember “is a rational and teleological activity guided by political
programmes structured by some sense of justice and the common good.” 285
One way to go about this task is to look at a statute in its systemic context
to see, for example, if a particular interpretation does not make sense. This
approach leads to the ascription of what MacCormick calls an “objective”
intention to a legislature. 286 What we are concerned with, though, is the
more robust approach under which legislative history may reveal the
“subjective” intent of legislators that can then be “called in aid in the
process of ascribing an ‘objective’ intention to the legislature as a
whole.” 287 So where legislative intent is at issue, information about the
circumstances of particular legislative acts can be helpful:
[T]hese include commission reports, committee papers, and the
like which identify a mischief and propose possible remedies for
it. The “intention of parliament” plays a proper role in legislative
interpretation, but not because there is a discoverable state of
somebody’s mind that can with special authenticity explain the
words used as bearing the meaning attested by that mental state.
On the contrary, it is because the legislature makes a practice of
legislating in English of a particular register; because rational acts
of legislation hang together in a coherent way internally and in
relation to the rest of the legal system; and because reforms aim
to remedy sensibly some identified deficiency; that one can
finally impute to the legislature an intention that certain words be
understood with a certain meaning rather than another one that
they might bear. “Intention” is a rhetorically effective and
legitimate way to frame a conclusion about what is the most
states that many arguments based on “purpose” are really mislabeled “intent” arguments.
Id. at 1024. Thus said, my proffered statement of RICO’s purpose may really be an
“intent.”
283. See Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of
Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 453 (2005) [hereinafter
Solan, Private Language].
284. MACCORMICK, supra note 126, at 134.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 135.
287. Id. at 136.
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reasonable interpretation in context, not a further argument to that
effect. 288
Here, as we have seen, there is copious evidence in the historical
record, the structure of the OCCA, and even the title of RICO that
Congress intended the statute to inhibit the corruption and infiltration of
legitimate organizations. But there is negative evidence on our narrow
issue as well: no one has ever pointed to any specific statement suggesting
that Congress, in passing RICO, was concerned about corporations
associating in fact as an “enterprise.” Thus, interpreting § 1961(4) in light
of legislative history to exclude groups of corporations from the definition
of “enterprise” is “not likely to fly in the face of what the statute was
intended to accomplish.” 289
Cognitive linguistics helps explain why knowing legislative intent is
required in performing statutory construction of a provision like § 1961(4).
Wright identifies two paradigmatic situations. The first involves staking
the boundaries of a statutory category—e.g., where a court must decide
whether an unenumerated item should nonetheless be included in a list. 290
For Wright, “Categories take on the structure they do precisely because
they relate to some goal or purpose of the language community[,]” so
knowing the legislature’s reasons for enacting a statute could alert a court
to the inner structure of a category and “in this way tell a court why the
members of the category have been placed in the category—that is, what
internal structure holds them together[.]” 291 As we have seen, one way of
thinking about § 1961(4) is that its first clause lays out formal legal entities
like partnerships and corporations and the second lays out less formal—yet
nonetheless legitimate—entities like unions. And this reading squares with
the legislative history in a way that a reading that would include “group of
corporations” in the category does not.
Wright’s second situation actually invokes § 1961(4) as an example

288. Id. at 137. Solan writes to similar effect:
[L]aws are written in language and language can only be understood in context.
The thinking of those who supported and proposed the law in the first place may
not reflect the will of every legislator, but it can certainly make some
contribution to statutory interpretation if used wisely. At the very least, it can
help us to determine whether the difficulty in applying the statute results from
an unfortunate choice of statutory language to effect a legislative goal that
becomes clear once one investigates the matter. And it can be used to confirm
that decisions made on other grounds are not likely to fly in the face of what the
statute was intended to accomplish.
Solan, Private Language, supra note 283, at 435.
289. Solan, Private Language, supra note 283, at 435.
290. Wright, supra note 279, at 994–95.
291. Id. at 995.
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and uses Cunningham’s work (discussed above) as a springboard. This
situation “is one in which two possible categorizations of a concept
conflict.” 292 This was the root problem in National Organization for
Women v. Scheidler (“NOW”), in which the Supreme Court was called
upon to decide whether an antiabortion group could qualify as a RICO
enterprise. 293 The defendants argued that an enterprise had to have an
economic purpose, a position that the Court rejected. 294 To recall our
earlier discussion, prior to NOW, Solan had argued that “enterprise” is a
“fuzzy” concept. While NOW was pending before the Supreme Court,
Cunningham and his group of linguists set out to test Solan’s thesis by, for
example, reviewing media uses of the term “enterprise” and questioning
native speakers as to whether they thought certain organizations were
“enterprises.” 295 Interestingly, the English speakers divided into two
groups, one focused “on whether the activity of the enterprise is organized
for the achievement of a goal to which the constituent members are jointly
committed; the other focuse[d] on whether the entity is like a business.” 296
As both Cunningham and Wright observe, this divide largely describes the
debate that was then going on in the courts. 297 For Wright, then,
“understanding more about the purposes of those who enacted RICO would
shed light on which categorization should be selected and, more
specifically, given Congress’s purpose in enacting RICO, whether [any
chosen candidate] should fit within the category of enterprise.” 298 Here
again, legislative history weighs heavily in the “like a business” camp, as
opposed to the “joint commitment” camp (i.e., a group of corporations
joining to commit illegal acts—which, as a matter of semantics—seems
more like a conspiracy than an enterprise).

292. Id.
293. Nat’l Org. for Women v. Scheidler (NOW), 510 U.S. 249, 252–54 (1994).
294. Id. at 258–59.
295. See Cunningham et al., supra note 167, at 1595–96 (discussing the difficulty in
attaining the true definition from statutes).
296. Id. at 1595.
297. Compare United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) (“The enterprise is
an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together for a common purpose
of engaging in a course of conduct. . . . The ‘enterprise’ is not the ‘pattern of racketeering
activity’; it is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages.”)
with Nat’l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 627 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 2958 (1993), rev’d, 510 U.S. 249 (1994) (“[T]he term enterprise ‘encompass[es]
only an association having an ascertainable structure which exists for the purpose of
maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal that has an existence that can be
defined apart from the commission of the predicate acts constituting the pattern of
racketeering activity.’” (quoting United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981)) (emphasis original)).
298. Wright, supra note 279, at 996 (emphasis original).
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The RICO statute is fraught with potential and actual ambiguity. Its
structure is convoluted, its legislative history is, in many respects, murky,
and its interpretation in the courts is often inconsistent and policy-driven
rather than text-driven. And it is on this last point that—as we have seen—
the circuit courts have made and replicated the decision to permit civil
plaintiffs (and, in a fewer number of cases, the Government) to allege
association-in-fact enterprises that include (and in many cases consist only
of) corporations or other legal entities. The root problem is that the
Supreme Court—in Turkette and again in Boyle—read § 1961(4) too
broadly, which has led to serious, though perhaps unintended,
consequences in civil litigation. That is now spilled milk, especially given
that the Supreme Court is unlikely to overrule itself on a point of statutory
construction, as evidenced by the Boyle decision itself, which could have
overturned Turkette or considerably narrowed its holding. So the question
remains, “What to do?”
First, litigants must continue to press and preserve the argument that a
corporation can never be part of an association in fact. This can be raised
both directly and as a predicate question in those § 1962(c) cases in which
the person-enterprise distinction is in dispute because a corporation is
alleged to be the defendant and part of an association in fact. Ethical
obligations to plead in good faith should be no bar here because—for the
most part—the circuits that have found it proper to include corporations in
associations in fact have done so without much reasoning or discussion and
the various Justices’ comments in Mohawk provide good cover for asking a
lower court to take a fresh look at the issue. Second, the Supreme Court
should grant certiorari in a case that squarely presents the question. The
circuits have uniformly misfired when holding on the point, and now—
because of Boyle’s expansive reading of § 1961(4)—is an opportune time
to read the statute fairly and literally to prevent the further “RICO-ization”
of commercial and consumer-fraud disputes that are better suited to
determination under state law.

